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'I'm sure mine only works one way,' Alice remarked.  
'I can't remember things before they happen.' 
'It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,' the Queen remarked. 

















The overall objective of this research project was to investigate the cognitive ability 
of episodic foresight in various drug-using populations. Episodic foresight refers to 
the uniquely human ability to mentally project the self into the future and pre-
experience an event. The first study (in press) was designed   to address an identified 
gap in our understanding of episodic foresight in long-term opiate users. A group of 
long term opiate users (n = 48) and a group of matched controls (n = 48) were 
compared on episodic foresight, and the contribution of memory and executive 
function to this ability were investigated. The results of the first study identified 
specific episodic foresight impairment in the context of chronic opiate use which was 
not secondary to memory or executive control processing. Given these findings and 
recent literature that has begun to explore the cognitive and neural underpinnings of 
episodic foresight, the primary objective of the second study was to explore whether 
the deficit in episodic foresight among long-term opiate users identified in Study 1 
may be attributable to compromised scene construction and/or self-projection 
abilities, both of which have been implicated in similar deficits observed in other 
clinical samples. This study assessed a group of long-term opiate users (n = 35) and 
demographically matched controls (n = 35). The results confirmed the episodic 
foresight deficit, and identified a specific impairment in self-projection. The third 
study aimed to assess whether an episodic foresight deficit would be observed in 
substance users at the less severe end of the spectrum of substance use. The third 
study assessed recreational cannabis users (n = 25) and demographically matched 
controls (n = 45). The results indicated no episodic foresight impairment in this 
group. Overall, the results of this research project suggest that compromised episodic 
foresight is apparent in the context of chronic but not recreational substance use. A 
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breakdown in episodic foresight may therefore represent an important potential 
mechanism that may contribute to the poor functional, social, and treatment outcomes 
often associated with chronic substance use.   
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Thesis Outline  
1.1 Introduction 
Substance abuse can severely impact the life of the using individual, and can also 
place significant socioeconomic strain on wider society. The most recent data on the cost of 
substance abuse (both licit and illicit) to Australian society estimated it to be $55.5 billion in 
the 2004/05 financial year (Collins & Lapsley, 2008). Illicit substances alone accounted for 
$8.2 billion of this estimate, which incorporate costs related to crime, healthcare, labour 
productivity (at home and in the workplace), fire, and road accidents. This estimate not only 
highlights the detrimental outcomes associated with substance abuse, but also reinforces the 
importance of prioritising this issue in various areas of research and policy development in 
order to prevent or reduce such devastating outcomes for individual users and society as a 
whole. 
Obtaining epidemiological data regarding substance use is a difficult task because in 
many countries the use of psychoactive substances is illegal and not all nations conduct 
regular national investigations into drug use trends. However the most recent prevalence 
estimates of global illicit drug use suggest approximately 5.2 per cent (243 million) of the 
population aged between 15 – 64 years are using illicit drugs (United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime, 2014). Overall, global illicit substance use increased between 2009 and 2012 with 
this being attributed to not only the increase in the worldwide population but also to an 
increase in substance use behaviour. Cannabis continues to be the most commonly abused 
substance worldwide (3.8%), with prevalence estimates showing a steady increase between 
2009 and 2012 (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). This is followed by the 
use of opioids (0.7%), amphetamine-type stimulants (0.7%), opiates (0.4%), cocaine (0.4%), 
and ecstasy (0.4%) (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). In Australia alone, the 
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results of the most recent National Drug Strategy reported that 14.7% of the adult population 
(individuals aged 14 – 64 years old) had used some type of illicit substance in the twelve 
months prior to the survey (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). This was a 
1.3% increase from the previous report in 2007. Similar to worldwide trends, cannabis is the 
most widely used illicit substance among Australians (10.3%), but this is followed by ecstasy 
(3%), amphetamine-like stimulants (2.1%), and then cocaine (2.1%) (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2011). Opiates such as heroin are relatively low in national prevalence 
(0.2%) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011) but  more deleterious outcomes are 
associated with opiates than more commonly used substances such as cannabis (United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). 
Irrespective of legality and variations of use, substances of abuse alter mood, 
cognition and behaviour by disrupting neurological functioning within the central nervous 
system. This can occur via two methods. The first is by the imitation of endogenous 
neurotransmitter systems, and the second is by overstimulation of the neurological circuits 
related to reward. Psychoactive substances are classified based on the nature of their 
neurological influence. Drugs such as alcohol, cannabis, opioids, and opiates exert their 
influence by depressing central nervous system functioning and are therefore classified as 
‘depressants’. Amphetamine-type stimulants such as amphetamines (ecstasy, speed), 
methamphetamines (ice, crack, crank) and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA; a 
derivative of ecstasy), and cocaine accelerate central nervous system functioning and thus are 
classified as ‘stimulants’. Many drugs of different classifications target similar neural regions 
but different neurocognitive outcomes can present given the variations in psychoactive 
properties between substances. Regardless of the nature of the substances, the associated 
neurological disruption is reflected in behavioural and cognitive changes, repeated relapses, 
as well as intense cravings when the individual is presented with substance related stimuli. 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
18 
However, not all use of psychoactive substances would be classified as problematic. 
Rather, substance use varies along a spectrum of severity depending upon frequency, duration 
and impact of use. General diagnosis of substance use disorders is related to the pathological 
behaviours surrounding the use of any particular substance (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). There are four groupings of pathological behaviours used in this 
diagnosis. The first criteria is related to impairments in control over the substance of choice; 
the second relates to social impairments as a result of substance use; the third concerns 
engagement in risky behaviours in the attainment and use of the substance; and lastly 
pharmacological effects of withdrawal and tolerance. Research has demonstrated that these 
presentations are reflections of underlying neurocognitive dysfunction (Baler & Volkow, 
2006; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Volkow & Fowler, 2000).  
1.2 Introduction to cognitive functioning in substance use 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of substance-using populations, many cognitive 
neuroscience oriented studies have highlighted the deleterious effects of illicit drug use on 
cognitive processing abilities (De Sola Llopis et al., 2008; Elmer et al., 2006; Fernández-
Serrano, Pérez-García, & Verdejo-García, 2011; Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, Río-
Valle, & Verdejo-García, 2010; Grant, Contoreggi, & London, 2000; Henry, Mazur, & 
Rendell, 2009; Henry, Phillips, et al., 2009; Leitz, Morgan, Bisby, Rendell, & Curran, 2009; 
Rendell, Mazur, & Henry, 2009; Terrett et al., 2014). For example, in studies by de Sola 
Llopis et al. (2008) and Fernandez-Serrano et al. (2010), individuals who used illicit 
substances performed significantly poorer across all tasks measuring executive functioning 
when compared to healthy, non-drug using individuals. In addition, drug users have been 
shown to exhibit significantly poorer decision making skills, verbal fluency and compromised 
inhibitory control (De Sola Llopis et al., 2008; Fernández-Serrano, Lozano, Pérez-García, & 
Verdejo-García, 2010; Fernández-Serrano et al., 2011; Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, et 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
19 
al., 2010) than non-drug users; with more severe, chronic users showing more pronounced 
deficits in the above mentioned processes as well as in processing speed and memory 
functions (De Sola Llopis et al., 2008). Furthermore, evidence for the neurotoxic effects of 
illicit substances has emerged from studies identifying compromised neurocognitive 
processes in substance users even after the achievement of abstinence (Cheng et al., 2013; 
Henry, Mazur, et al., 2009; Rendell et al., 2009). Such deficits in higher-order cognitions 
have been used to explain impairments in social, financial, adaptive functioning (Goldstein, 
1991; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002; Henry, Mazur, et al., 2009; Volkow, Fowler, Wang, & 
Goldstein, 2002) which are characteristic of individuals who engage in chronic substance use 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However a noticeable exclusion from the 
substance use literature is the assessment of the cognitive ability of episodic foresight.  
1.3 Introduction to episodic foresight 
The concept of mental time travel was proposed by Tulving who originally 
differentiated memories relating to general information from memories of personally relevant 
information; semantic and episodic memories respectively (Tulving, 2002). Tulving went on 
to suggest that it is the episodic memory system that allows humans to re-experience events 
of the past. Subsequently, memory research extended this idea by investigating the memory 
for future intentions; that is, remembering to perform a task at a later date. This ability was 
termed prospective memory. Episodic and prospective memory have been shown to have 
some overlap as remembering to complete a task at a later date not only requires the recall 
that a task requires completion, but also recall of the exact task (Rendell, Gray, Henry, & 
Tolan, 2007). Both prospective and episodic memory have gained a large amount of research 
attention, interest however within the last decade research interest has increased regarding the 
ability to pre-experience events intended for the future (Atance & O'Neill, 2005; Schacter & 
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Addis, 2007). This process has many labels, but for the purpose of this research, it is referred 
to as episodic foresight. 
In 2007 the topic of episodic foresight was named one of the top 10 trending areas in 
cognitive neuroscience (Science, 2007). Episodic foresight refers to the ability to mentally 
time travel into the future and pre-experience an event (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). Not 
to be confused with the ability to acknowledge the existence of a future time period, the 
defining element of episodic foresight is the ability to imagine what the experience would be 
like for the individual in that future time period (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2007). It has been described as one of the fundamental human characteristics that 
separate our species from others (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). The adaptive value of 
episodic foresight has been highlighted throughout the literature and arguments against its 
importance are scarce (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). The current literature has not only 
identified the importance of this ability in day to day functioning (D'Argembeau, Renaud, & 
Van der Linden, 2011), but has also highlighted how impairments can significantly influence 
the adaptive functioning of vulnerable clinical groups (Brown et al., 2014; D'Argembeau, 
Raffard, & van der Linden, 2008; de Vito et al., 2012; Lind & Bowler, 2010; MacLeod, 2010; 
Raffard, D'Argembeau, Bayyard, Boulenger, & van der Linden, 2010; Sarkohi, Bjärehed, & 
Andersson, 2011; Terrett et al., 2013). With greater knowledge of this ability, including a 
better understanding of the cognitive processes that underpin it, a more holistic understanding 
of clinical presentations and their treatment responses can be developed; and if needed can 
inform alternative methods of therapeutic intervention.  
1.4 Summary of the studies in the current research project  
The overall objective of this research project was to investigate the cognitive ability 
of episodic foresight in users of illicit substances. This research project consists of three 
separate studies, reported in three individual journal articles, which address specific 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
21 
objectives. The first of the three articles has been accepted for publication, and the two 
articles that follow have been submitted for review.  
The first study was designed to address an identified gap in the understanding of 
episodic foresight ability among substance users. More specifically, given the well-
documented neurological and functional consequences of chronic drug use, the first study 
assessed a sample of dependent drug users engaging in opiate substitution treatment. A 
number of impairments in future-oriented cognitions such as prospective memory (Terrett et 
al., 2014) and decision making (Brand, Roth-Bauer, Driessen, & Markowitsch, 2008; Piratsu 
et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 1999), have been identified in the context of chronic opiate use 
raising the possibility that impairment in the capacity for episodic foresight  might also be 
apparent in this group. Furthermore, memory and executive control processes, which have 
been implicated in episodic foresight, are also compromised in long-term drug users. 
Therefore using a quasi-experimental design, the specific objectives of the first study of this 
project were: 
1. To investigate episodic foresight ability in a group of long term opiate users 
2. To determine whether memory and executive functions contribute to episodic 
foresight ability in the context of chronic, illicit substance use 
The results of the first study identified specific episodic foresight impairment in the 
sample of long-term substance users. This deficit was not secondary to memory or executive 
control processing which raised questions surrounding what other abilities may be 
contributing to this identified impairment in episodic foresight. Recent literature has begun to 
explore the involvement of other cognitive abilities, such as scene construction and self-
projection, in episodic foresight. As a result, the primary objective of the second study was: 
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3. To explore whether the identified episodic foresight deficit found in Study 1 may be 
attributable to compromised scene construction and/or self-projection 
The findings of Study 2 identified a specific difficulty for opiate users in the capacity 
for self-projection into the future. The compromised episodic foresight as a result of impaired 
self-projection was discussed as a possible mechanism underpinning poor adaptive 
functioning and treatment success which are characteristic of this group.  
However, considering that opiate use is relatively low in prevalence, the third study 
aimed to assess whether a similar deficit in episodic foresight would be observed in substance 
users of more commonly used substances, particularly cannabis. The third study employed 
the same methodology as Study 1 and assessed a group of recreational cannabis users on their 
episodic foresight ability. Thus the objectives of the third, and final, study of this project 
were: 
4. To assess how episodic foresight is affected in the context of regular cannabis use 
5. To examine the degree to which performance on measures of episodic foresight is 
correlated with performance on measures of episodic memory and executive 
control.  
The results indicated an absence of episodic foresight, episodic memory, or executive 
function impairment in the context of regular cannabis use. These findings highlight that the 
capacity for episodic foresight is impacted differently within the context of different 
pharmacological substances. The results obtained from the three separate studies provide 
greater insight into the episodic foresight ability of different substance-using groups, which 
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1.5 Outline of the thesis  
This thesis begins with an introductory chapter followed by two separate literature 
review chapters providing research findings relevant to each of the three studies. The first 
review chapter presents the current literature regarding cognitive processing in the context of 
illicit substance use. The purpose of this review is to support the rationale for investigating 
the specific capacity of episodic foresight, which has been a notable exclusion from the 
current literature on substance use.  
The second review chapter presents a review of episodic foresight literature. This 
chapter provides a definition and discussion of neurological underpinnings, contributing 
processes, functional importance, and evidence of episodic foresight deficits in other clinical 
populations. This chapter review sets the scene for all three empirical studies presented in this 
research project.  
Each of the three journal articles, which are then presented, is preceded by a brief 
introduction chapter that reminds the reader of the relevant research literature used to develop 
each study’s rationale. These chapters also outline the key findings and conclusions 
associated with each study.  
This thesis concludes with an overall review and discussion chapter. This final 
chapter reviews the findings, limitations and conclusions of each study and discusses the 
functional implications and future research directions. The ethics approval letter from the 
Australian Catholic University Ethics Board that covers all three studies is included in 
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CHAPTER 2: Review of neurocognitive functioning within the context of substance 
use 
Psychoactive substances exert their influence via altering neurocognitive processing 
(Goldstein, 1991; Koob & Volkow, 2010) either by mimicking naturally occurring 
neurotransmitters or by manipulating the release or recycling of these chemicals. Both lead to 
abnormal communication between neurons responsible for many aspects of emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioural functioning. This research project focuses on opiates and 
cannabis. Opiates (e.g. morphine, heroin) and cannabis represent substances commonly 
considered to lie at opposite poles of the drug-using spectrum. The former is considered a 
substance of choice for seasoned drug users, whereas the latter is generally associated with 
early experimentation. Each will now be considered in detail in terms of their respective 
neurological influence and associated cognitive dysfunction.  
2.1 Opiates defined 
Globally, opiate use accounts for the most drug-related diseases and deaths (United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). Opiates have the capacity to cross the blood-brain 
barrier making them very potent substances (Denier, Schmidt, et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2008; 
Pau, Lee, & Chan, 2002). Route of administration is generally determined by the purity of the 
substance, but common methods include inhalation through nasal cavities (snorted), smoking, 
or intravenous injection; all of which lead to rapid delivery into the central nervous system 
(CNS). Opiates exert their influence by selectively binding to and activating opioid receptors 
found within various areas of the CNS including the amygdala, hypothalamus, cerebellum, 
brain stem, and spinal cord (Leri, Bruneau, & Stewart, 2003; Younger et al., 2011). Delta (∆), 
kappa (κ), and mu (µ) receptors are the three different classes of opioid receptors that can be 
activated by both endogenous neuropeptides (e.g. endorphins) as well as exogenous 
compounds (e.g. morphine and heroin) (Leri et al., 2003; Waldhoer, Barlett, & Whistler, 
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2004).  Opioid drugs are therefore categorized based on the type of receptor they bind to, 
with commonly abused drugs such as morphine and heroin primarily agonizing with µ - 
opioid receptors (Leri et al., 2003) which are particularly abundant in the amygdala and 
hypothalamus (key regions of the limbic system associated with reward, emotional 
regulation, and cognition). Given that opiates target key structures within the CNS, it might 
therefore be anticipated that neurocognitive impairment would be apparent.  
2.2 Brain abnormalities associated with chronic opiate use 
2.2.1 Structural changes  
A number of different structural abnormalities have been reported within the context 
of chronic opiate use, including reduced ventricle/brain ratio (Wolf & Mikhael, 1979), 
volume loss in frontal regions (Pezawas et al., 1998), white matter abnormalities (Lyoo et al., 
2004), reduced cerebral blood flow (Denier, Gerber, et al., 2013; Denier, Schmidt, et al., 
2013), and decreased cortical thickness (Li et al., 2014). Although there is some variability in 
these findings likely reflecting differences in methodology and the heterogeneous substances 
use history common among life-long users of opiates, one structural change that has been 
repeatedly observed in the context of chronic opiate use is abnormal grey matter densities 
within key CNS regions (Denier, Schmidt, et al., 2013; Liu, Hao, et al., 2009; Lyoo et al., 
2006; Qiu et al., 2013; Yuan et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2009).  
Grey matter refers to the neural tissue made up of cell bodies and glial cells. Given its 
composition, grey matter plays a fundamental role in receiving and transporting sensory 
information throughout the CNS and the body.  The brain is predominately made up of grey 
matter and areas of high density tend to be associated with high levels of functioning related 
to the specific brain region. Therefore reductions in grey matter would be expected to be 
reflected in impaired cognitive ability.  
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In one study addressing this question in the context of substance use, Lyoo et al. 
(2006) compared the grey matter density of a large group of opiate-dependent individuals  
(n = 63) with a matched group healthy controls. The authors were the first to use Voxel-based 
morphometry (VBM) to assess grey matter concentrations within the brains of opiate-
dependent individuals (see Ashburner & Friston, 2000 for detailed description of VBM).  The 
images identified that relative to the healthy comparison group, opiate-dependent participants 
had reduced grey matter concentrations within prefrontal and temporal cortices. Similarly, 
Yuan et al. (2009) observed reduced concentrations of grey matter within the prefrontal, 
temporal, as well as the anterior cingulate, and insular cortices. Both studies suggested that 
these findings might provide some explanation for compromised processing in executive, 
sensory, memory, and emotional domains that are governed by these regions. Interestingly, 
Yuan et al. (2009) also observed a correlation between duration of opiate use and grey matter 
density (longer opiate use was associated with lower the grey matter concentrations). 
Interestingly, unlike most studies of opiate dependence, the sample recruited by Yuan et al. 
(2009) could be considered a novice group of opiate users (mean age = 23.97 years, mean 
duration of use = 4.93 year) therefore the relationship found in that study between duration of 
use and grey matter concentrations highlights a detrimental effect of opiate use on 
neurocognitive functioning, even within the early years of use. Thus, although structural 
imagining studies relating to chronic opiate use are limited, those that have been conducted 
have consistently demonstrated that relative to healthy individuals, long term opiate users 
have significant reductions in grey matter density within prefrontal and temporal brain 
regions, which are areas responsible for a number of important processes such as executive 




EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
27 
2.2.2 Functional resting-state abnormalities  
There has however been some criticism of previous structural imaging studies with 
Yuan et al. (2010) arguing that they have limited clinical significance given that structural 
and functional abnormalities within the context of opiate use tend to be examined in isolation. 
As a result, they conducted a study of grey matter deficits associated with opiate use that 
focused on an association between structural irregularities and functional connectivity during 
resting-state. Resting-state functional connectivity refers to the activity of neural circuits of 
the resting-brain and is assessed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) which 
allows for the examination of unaltered inter-region connectivity. Observation of 
abnormalities in connectivity during resting-state can predict alterations of neurocognitive 
activation of the same brain areas during performance of domain specific tasks (Sutherland, 
McHugh, Pariyadath, & Stein, 2012). Abnormal resting-state functional connectivity between 
key CNS brain regions in long-term opiate users has been observed in a number of studies 
(Cheng et al., 2013; Liu, Liang, et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2010). 
The initial findings of Yuan et al. (2010) were consistent with the literature as they 
found reduced grey matter concentrations in frontal, (right dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex 
(DLPFC)) and temporal regions (right fusiform gyrus and left middle cingulate cortex), as 
well as in the left parietal lobe. However as noted, the novel element of this study was the 
examination of the relationship between these anatomical deficits and resting-state functional 
connectivity, and also whether the connectivity between brain regions during resting-state 
was associated with duration of opiate use. The authors did indeed observe reduced 
connectivity between the right DLPFC and the inferior parietal lobe in the opiate group 
highlighting an association between structural changes and functional connectivity in these 
areas. These findings suggest that processes governed by the DLPFC and the inferior parietal 
lobe, such as decision-making and working memory respectively, may be particularly 
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vulnerable to impairment within the context of opiate use. In addition, the authors also 
observed a negative relationship between the duration of opiate use and the functional 
connectivity between these two areas, highlighting that the cumulative negative effect of 
opiates not only applies to neurological structures (as discussed earlier), but also extends to 
functional connectivity.  
Others investigations that identified dysfunctional resting-state connectivity between 
key CNS brain regions in opiate users include a study by Liu, Liang, et al. (2009) which 
identified abnormalities in the pre-frontal cortex (PFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
supramarginal motor area, ventral stratium, hippocampus, amygdala, and insula. In addition, 
Ma et al. (2010) observed increased connectivity between the nucleus accumbens and ACC, 
and orbito frontal cortex (OFC), and between the amygdala and OFC; but reductions in 
connectivity were observed between the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) in long term opiate users. Cheng et al. (2013) also reported irregular 
connectivity between the right DLPFC and each of the following brain regions: the OFC, 
right entrohinal cortex (EC; part of the medial temporal lobe [MTL]), occipitoparietal cortex 
(OC) and ACC. 
Despite the methodological variations between the studies, the findings all highlight 
significant abnormalities within key CNS regions both in terms of decreased grey matter 
concentrations as well as dysfunctional connectivity at resting-state. The cognitive domains 
underpinned by these regions include inhibitory control (PFC, ACC), conflict monitoring 
(ACC), reward processing (nucleus accumbens), motivation (OFC), learning (amygdala), and 
memory (hippocampus) (Baler & Volkow, 2006). Therefore disruption to circuitry between 
these regions is likely to lead to a breakdown in these cognitive faculties.  
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2.2.3 Effects of opiates on immunology  
Cheng et al. (2013) also examined the relationship between structural and functional 
processing associated with opiate use. However, rather than focusing on grey matter 
concentrations the authors were the first to investigate cell immunology in the context of 
long-term opiate use by examining telomerase. Telomerase refers to an enzyme that prevents 
the shortening of chromatin structures known as telomeres which are found at the end of 
chromosomes. In essence, telomerase prevents cellular aging (Campisi & d'Adda di Fagagna, 
2007) therefore declines in telomerase activity indicate acceleration of aging. Research has 
indeed identified age-related declines in telomerase activity (Blasco, 2005). Cheng et al. 
(2013) observed reduced telomerase activity within the right DLPFC of opiate users, relative 
to a healthy control group. Given that the prefrontal structures are particularly vulnerable to 
the aging process (Burke & Barnes, 2006; Reuter-Lorenz & Lustig, 2005) this observation 
prompted Cheng et al. (2013) to conclude that chronic opiate use accelerates the aging 
process (at least on a cellular level). Also, because both healthy aging and opiate using 
groups have demonstrated similar atrophy in the DLPFC, it has been postulated that similar 
age-related cognitive declines would be expected within the context of chronic opiate use, 
which may assist in explaining deficits in cognitive functioning commonly associated with 
this group.  
Overall, the cumulative neuroimaging evidence relating to chronic opiate use suggests 
that a number of cognitive domains are vulnerable to impairments. In particular, given that 
prefrontal regions govern higher-order cognitions known as executive functions and the 
temporal areas of the brain are implicated in memory-related processes, it might be 
anticipated that these processes would be vulnerable.  
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2.2.4 Opiate-related declines in executive functions  
Executive functions refer to complex goal directed cognitive faculties including 
inhibitory control, attention, decision-making, memory, and planning. Given the prominence 
of these abilities in everyday life, dysfunction within any of these domains can create 
significant difficulty in the fulfilment of even basic responsibilities, let alone more 
demanding obligations. Executive dysfunction has been linked to atrophy within frontal brain 
regions, and groups with established frontal lobe damage (e.g. Parkinson ’s disease, 
Alzheimer’s disease) have been shown to display deficits in higher-order cognitions (de Vito 
et al., 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013). Given that opiates have the capacity to impact structural 
features and functional processing in frontal brain regions it might therefore be expected that 
these higher-order cognitions would also be substantially impaired.  
A number of studies have identified significant impairments in executive processes 
within the context of chronic opiate use in comparison to healthy control groups. For 
example, Pau et al. (2002) examined the impact of opiate use on performance across a 
number of neuropsychological measures. The authors compared a group of opiate addicted 
individuals with a healthy comparison group. The findings indicated that chronic opiate use 
was associated with compromised impulse control; a result that was also found in subsequent 
studies (Brand et al., 2008; Posser et al., 2006). Other compromised executive processes that 
have been reported include attention (Brand et al., 2008; Darke, Sims, McDonald, & Wickes, 
2000) cognitive flexibility (Brand et al., 2008), cognitive initiation/verbal fluency (Davis, 
Liddiard, & McMillan, 2002), and decision making (Brand et al., 2008; Ersche, Clark, 
London, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006; Fishbein et al., 2007), all of which are imperative for 
successful day-to-day living. However, while these studies suggest that executive control 
impairment is associated with chronic opiate use, the picture is not clear-cut. In fact, some 
studies of this group have reported minimal (Pau et al., 2002) or no impairment (Terrett et al., 
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2014) in higher-order cognitions. These inconsistences may reflect methodological 
differences (e.g. in terms of choices of measurement) and also the heterogeneous nature of 
this population.  
2.2.5 Opiate-related memory declines 
There are a number of different types of memory processes, including episodic 
memory, working memory, and prospective memory. Episodic memory refers to the capacity 
to retrieve and mentally reconstruct personally experienced events whereas working memory 
refers to the memory store which allows for the temporary storage and subsequent 
manipulation of newly learnt information (Tulving, 1985). Prospective memory on the other 
hand refers to the ability to remember to complete future intentions (Einstein et al., 2005). 
The different forms of memory are associated with different temporal regions (e.g. 
hippocampus, basal ganglia) but the execution of these memory functions is complex and can 
incorporate different neural networks (Moscovitch, 1992).  
These memory processes play an important role in every day functioning. For 
instance, when making choices for future actions we usually draw upon our experiences from 
the past (i.e. episodic memory) to inform those decisions. Those actions that resulted in 
unrewarding outcomes in the past would therefore be altered in order to increase the 
likelihood of improved results and future goal attainment. Impairments in prospective 
memory also have the potential to significantly affect the execution of everyday tasks and the 
maintenance of social engagement, and threaten treatment compliance as this cognitive 
faculty supports the ability to not only remember that a future task needs executing, but also 
what that task is. As previously mentioned, given the identified atrophy within temporal 
regions associated with chronic opiate use, impairment in these memory processes would 
therefore be expected. This has been shown in empirical studies which have identified opiate-
specific deficits in various memory functions including episodic memory, working memory, 
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and prospective memory (Curran, Kleckham, Bearn, Strang, & Wanigaratne, 2001; Darke et 
al., 2000; Ornstein et al., 2000; Terrett et al., 2014). However similar to the literature 
surrounding opiate use and executive functioning, the findings for opiate-related memory 
impairments are not consistent (e.g. Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, et al., 2010; Fishbein 
et al., 2007). Reasons for this include methodological differences relating to 
neuropsychological battery chosen, the heterogeneous nature of substance use histories 
reported by chronic opiate users, onset and duration of opiate use, and rates of concurrent 
poly-substance use tend to be high in this drug using group, making it extremely difficult to 
recruit pure opiate users and delineate the effects of other substances.  
2.3 Cannabis 
Another psychoactive substance that has been the subject of increasing research 
interest within the cognitive neurosciences is cannabis. Although it is generally considered a 
benign substance, cannabis continues to be the world’s most used illicit drug with at least 180 
million users globally, and cannabis dependence is the most common type of substance 
addiction (after alcohol and tobacco) in a number of developed countries including the United 
States, Canada and Australia (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014).  
Furthermore, there has been a recent increase in cannabis related treatment enrolment with a 
59% rise in cannabis-related emergency visits between 2006 and 2010 in the United States 
alone (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014) challenging the notion that it is a 
substance devoid of negative outcomes. Initial use tends to occur during late adolescence and 
this early introduction to the drug can significantly alter neuronal development  (Parker, 
Williams, & Aldridge, 2002) and increases the likelihood of developing future addiction by 
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2.4 Cannabis defined 
Cannabis is derived from the Cannabis sativa plant which contains over 70 unique 
chemical compounds known as cannabinoids (Pertwee, 2008). The highest concentrations of 
cannabinoids are found in the flowering tops of the plant whereas very small densities are 
found in the stem and roots (Ameri, 1999). The primary cannabinoid responsible for the 
desired psychoactive effects of cannabis is ∆9 – tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) which binds to 
the CB1 – cannabinoid receptors found within the endocannabinoid neural network (Batalla 
et al., 2013). Like most psychoactive substances, THC exerts its influence by activating the 
release of dopamine, a neurotransmitter largely implicated in the pleasure and reward 
systems. Brain regions with high densities of cannabinoid receptors include the prefrontal 
cortex, cerebellum, stratium, amygdala, and hippocampus (Ameri, 1999; Glass, Dragunow, & 
Faull, 1997; Mechoulam & Parker, 2013; Quickfall & Crockford, 2006) therefore any 
negative impact of cannabis use might be anticipated to be particularly apparent in these 
regions.  
2.5 Brain abnormalities associated with cannabis use 
2.5.1 Structural atrophy 
According to Yücel et al. (2008) animal studies provide the strongest argument for the 
notion that cannabis is neurotoxic for the brain. For instance, an early rodent study by 
Landfield, Cadwallader, and Vinsant (1988) identified hippocampal changes in response to 
long-term THC exposure. The investigators observed decreased neuronal densities within this 
region and concluded that their observations provided evidence that chronic exposure can 
lead to structural changes in the brain. Chan, Hinds, Impey, and Storm (1998) observed THC-
related neuronal death within hippocampal slices of rodent brains and Lawson, Borella, 
Robinson, and Whitaker-Azmitia (2000) identified morphological changes in the 
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hippocampus of male rodents which were reminiscent of alterations seen as a result of 
ischemic or traumatic brain injury. The authors of these studies postulated that the THC-
related structural changes observed in rodent brains might be paralleled in the brains of 
cannabis users and in turn may help explain, at least to some extent, the cognitive difficulties 
often reported and observed in users of the drug. However, similar to the opiate-related 
literature, investigations of cannabis use in humans have produced a heterogeneous literature 
regarding cannabis-related structural and functional brain changes.  
For example, Matochik, Elderth, Cadet, and Bolla (2005) observed differences in both 
grey and white matter densities between heavy cannabis users and non-using individuals. 
More specifically, the investigators identified reductions in grey matter concentrations within 
hippocampal regions but increased white matter densities within temporal lobe areas 
(fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus), the lentiform nucelus and in the pons of the 
brainstem. Furthermore, a study by Yücel et al. (2008) reported that chronic and heavy 
cannabis use was associated with volumetric reductions of the hippocampus and amygdala. 
They went on to further conclude that the decrease in hippocampal volume was a function of 
cumulative cannabis exposure, and although they did not anticipate the reduction in size of 
the amygdala it is not a surprising outcome given that this area is also richly dense in 
cannabinoid receptors (Ameri, 1999; Quickfall & Crockford, 2006).  
A similar reduction in hippocampal volume has also been observed in adolescents 
with a history of heavy cannabis use (Ashtari et al., 2011). The cannabis-using group reported 
at least one year of heavy cannabis consumption (average daily use reported as 5.8 joints), 
but were currently abstinent (average length 6.7 months) and seeking treatment. In the 
cannabis group both the left and right hippocampi were significantly lower in volume (14.2% 
and 12.6% reductions respectively) than the healthy, non-using control group. This reduction 
in structural volume was also negatively correlated with amount of cannabis use. That is, the 
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higher the cannabis consumption, the smaller the hippocampal volume observed. This study 
not only identified cannabis-related structural changes, but also indicated that early and heavy 
cannabis use can result in persistent neurological impairment.   
Zalesky et al. (2012) used axonal connectivity as a means to assess whether long-term 
cannabis use was associated with microstructural white matter alterations. The investigators 
observed impaired axonal connectivity within the hippocampus of their cannabis-using 
sample, relative to a healthy comparison group. The investigators also identified that the age 
of onset of cannabis  use was positively related to the severity of the white matter alterations, 
leading to the conclusion that the early introduction to cannabis use can increase the level of 
neurological impairment. This finding is consistent with that of Churchwell, Lopez-Larson, 
and Yurgelun-Todd (2010) who reported that reductions in neuronal tissue volumes within 
the medial prefrontal cortex were associated with age of first use, therefore suggesting that 
early initiation into cannabis use may lead to greater structural atrophy.  
In a very recent investigation, Battistella et al. (2014) observed reduced grey matter 
volume in a number of brain areas of cannabis users including hippocampal regions. 
Reductions were observed in the medial temporal cortex, temporal pole, parrahippocampal 
gyrus, insula, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). These reductions were strongly associated with 
frequency of use indicating that increased use may intensify the severity of cannabis-related 
neurological atrophy. Similar to previous studies (Churchwell et al., 2010; Zalesky et al., 
2012), age of onset was suggested to be a factor contributing to grey matter reductions, with 
younger (during adolescence) initiation to recreational cannabis use potentially playing a 
crucial role in the reduced grey matter concentrations. However, it was also proposed that 
heavy use of cannabis irrespective of age of onset contributed to the neuronal tissue decrease. 
It should be noted however that not all studies of cannabis users have reported structural 
brain abnormalities. For example, Block, O'Leary, Ehrhardt, et al. (2000) did not observe any 
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cannabis-related changes in global or tissue volume when they assessed a group of frequent 
cannabis users and compared them to non-using controls. Similarly, Tzilos et al. (2005) failed 
to identify abnormalities in neuronal tissue or hippocampal volume in long-term cannabis 
users. Explanations for these inconsistent findings have focused on variations in aspects of 
methodology (e.g. sample size, brain scanning method) and participant characteristics, such 
as differences in substance-using histories.  
2.5.2 Functional resting-state abnormalities  
Over and above structural abnormalities, global and regional resting-state brain 
abnormalities have also been observed in frequent cannabis users. For example, Block, 
O'Leary, Hichwa, et al. (2000) compared the regional brain blood flow of frequent cannabis 
users to a group of non-using controls. The cannabis group recruited for this study were 
regular users of the drug with the average frequency of use reported as at least seven times 
per week. The group did not have any past or current substance dependence, and were 
assessed after at least 26 hours of hospital monitored abstinence to control for potential 
effects of short-term withdrawal. Results of positron emission tomography (PET) imagining 
data revealed region specific functional abnormalities within the posterior cerebellum of the 
cannabis group. Given that the cerebellum is implicated in the internal timing system, it was 
concluded that the hypoactivity observed in this region during resting-state may contribute to 
the altered time perception commonly experienced during cannabis intoxication. 
In addition, Lundqvist, Jönsson, and Warkentin (2001) assessed the cerebral blood 
flow of a group of cannabis dependent users (n = 12) and an aged matched group of healthy 
control participants. The cannabis group were assessed within five days of voluntary 
cessation from their regular use. The findings highlighted decreased hemispheric blood flow 
for both cerebral hemispheres within the cannabis group, as well as regional reductions 
within prefrontal, superiorfrontal, and central areas. Reductions in cerebral blood flow to 
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frontal regions could pose a significant threat to cognitions governed by these areas. For 
instance, it is well documented that executive functions (e.g. decision making, planning, and 
cognitive flexibility) are particularly sensitive to prefrontal dysfunction (Dubois, Slachevsky, 
Litvan, & Pillon, 2000). Therefore significant cannabis-related reductions in cerebral blood 
flow could lead to tissue death which can potentially give rise to a break down in cognitive 
processing.  
Sevy et al. (2008) used PET to measure dopamine receptor availability and cerebral 
glucose metabolism in a small group (n = 6) of young adults (18 – 21 years old) diagnosed 
with cannabis dependence in full remission. Although the investigators did not find any 
difference in the dopamine receptor density, they did observe reduced glucose metabolism in 
the right OFC, putamen bilaterally, and precuneus. This finding provides more support for the 
notion of cannabis-related neurological harm. The metabolism of glucose is imperative for 
brain functioning (Mergenthaler, Lindauer, Dienel, & Meisel, 2013). Neurons are one of the 
cell types that particularly rely on glucose for energy therefore disruptions to the metabolic 
breakdown of glucose can pose significant threat to cell functioning in areas responsible for 
cognitive processing (Mergenthaler et al., 2013).  
Orr and colleagues (2013) also assessed neurological functioning in the context of 
chronic cannabis use, but in a sample of cannabis-dependent adolescents (n = 17). Their 
findings further highlighted cannabis-related changes in neurological functioning. Relative to 
healthy control participants, the cannabis-using adolescents displayed significant neurological 
abnormalities which may have the potential to alter the execution of cognitive tasks. The 
primary findings illustrated that the functional connectivity between the fronto-parietal and 
cerebellar regions was greater for the cannabis-dependent group particularly in the right 
hemisphere. The authors suggested that the increase in functional connectivity may be 
indicative of compensatory mechanisms. That is, in the context of chronic cannabis use, more 
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effort is required in order to execute cognitive tasks. Orr et al. (2014) also identified a 
reduction in homotopic connectivity (inter-hemispheric communication) of cerebellar and 
fronto-parietal regions, possibly reflecting the negative impact of chronic cannabis use on the 
integrity of the corpus callosum. This outcome is particularly important because inter-
hemispheric communication is necessary for coherent cognition and behavioural 
performance. Disruptions in functional connectivity between hemispheres have been 
identified in psychiatric disorders that are characterised by significant cognitive and 
behavioural difficulties (e.g. schizophrenia, autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) 
(Clarke et al., 2008; Pettigrew & Miller, 1998; Spencer et al., 2003). Therefore the reduction 
in inter-hemispheric communication may potentially play a significant role in the level of 
functioning displayed by chronic cannabis users.  
More recently, Fibely et al. (2014) identified significant changes in the OFC in a 
sample of long-term adult cannabis users (n = 48). This sample included a subset (n = 25) of 
cannabis-dependent individuals. In comparison to a group of non-using control participants, 
the chronic users had lower grey matter volumes within the OFC, and this finding remained 
in the smaller sample of dependent users. The authors described this finding as unsurprising 
given that the OFC is highly dense in CB1 receptors, and is a significant region with the 
reward network; an area implicated in the development and maintenance of addiction. A 
secondary finding from this study was the increased functional connectivity between the OFC 
and other brain regions. Similar to Orr et al. (2013) the authors suggested that the contrast 
between these two main findings may indicate neurological compensation. The down-
regulation within the OFC supports claims about the neurotoxicity of cannabis, but the 
increased connectivity within the OFC network may be indicative of the need for greater 
processing in order to execute various cognitive tasks.  
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Pujol et al. (2014) explored functional resting-state connectivity in a group of 
cannabis-dependent adult male (n = 28). The authors focused on the Default and Insula 
networks, areas associated with self-awareness. It is widely accepted that these two networks 
make different contributions to the capacity for self-awareness. The primary elements of the 
Default network are the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and adjacent precuneus, angular 
gyri and medial frontal cortex. Functions include supporting the ability to recognise the body 
and its interaction with the external environment, solving moral dilemmas, assisting in the 
comprehension of another individual’s perspective, retrieving autobiographical memories, 
and prospective thinking. The Insula network however contributes to the capacity for 
introspective awareness, including conscious awareness of physiological conditions and 
emotional experiences. These two networks do not function in isolation but share relevant 
overlap. In the context of chronic cannabis use, Pujol and colleagues identified various 
alterations in functional connectivity within these two brain networks. In relation to the 
Default network, increases and decreases in functional connectivity were identified in the 
PCC and these alterations in connectivity were linked to reduced memory abilities. Increased 
functional connectivity was found in the Insula network and it was suggested by the authors 
that the activation of this network may play a role in the modification of an individual’s 
subjective affective state. The intricacies of the neurological alterations identified in the 
aforementioned studies are beyond the scope of this research project. However, these studies 
highlight that cannabis-use has the potential to significantly alter resting-state functioning and 
therefore suggests that alterations may also be found in cognitive functioning.  
2.5.3 Cannabis–related cognitive impairments  
Although there is continued debate over the impact of cannabis consumption on 
cognitive functioning, a number of studies have highlighted the potential for compromised 
abilities in this domain. For example, Bolla, Elderth, Matochik, and Cadet (2005) assessed a 
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group of abstinent cannabis users (at least 25 days of abstinence following an average of 5 
years heavy use) on their decisional making capacity using the Iowa Gambling Task. Relative 
to a matched control group, the cannabis group demonstrated poorer performance on the task, 
indicating hypersensitivity to immediate rewards but not to potential losses or negative 
outcomes. In another study Abdullaev, Posner, Nunnally, and Dishion (2010) reported that 
chronic cannabis use during adolescence contributed to a compromised attention network, 
particularly related to conflict resolution. The cannabis group took more time to resolve 
presenting conflicts and were more erroneous in their choices, relative to the control group. 
Previous studies also observed compromised response monitoring ability within samples of 
cannabis users reflected in their reduced capacity to recognise errors in performance (Gruber 
& Yurgelun-Todd, 2005; Hester, Nestor, & Garavan, 2009). However the studies conducted 
by Gruber and Yurgelun-Todd (2005) and Hester et al. (2009) did not identify overarching 
deficits in cognitive domains. For example, the cannabis group in these studies performed 
comparably to the controls on measures of inhibitory control (the Stroop and Go/No-go 
response tasks, respectively). 
Given the high cannabinoid concentrations within the hippocampus and surrounding 
regions, the literature tends to focus on investigating possible cannabis related impairments in 
functions associated with these areas. One of the most frequently investigated domains is 
memory. A number of recent reviews on the neuropsychological impact of cannabis use have 
repeatedly highlighted consistent findings within the literature associating cannabis use with 
compromised memory abilities (Gonzalez, 2007; Hall, 2014; Solowij & Battisti, 2008). For 
example, in a study involving a particularly large sample size than is usual in studies of 
cannabis users (n = 51) Solowij and Battisti (2008) compared the performance of long-term, 
heavy cannabis users to a sample of shorter-term users (n = 51) and a control group. The 
heavy users were significantly poorer in the execution of memory and attention based tasks 
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compared to the shorter-term using group and the control participants, and no differences 
were found between the latter two groups. Of all the measures administered, the greatest 
difference in performance was observed in the memory assessment (RAVLT), indicating a 
global impairment in learning, retention and retrieval of information. The authors concluded 
that heavy cannabis use is associated with impairments that persist beyond intoxication and 
furthermore that cannabis-related declines were a function of the duration of use.  
The literature tends to conclude that the level of decline in cognitive processing as a 
result of cannabis use is influenced by a number of factors including dose, type of cannabis, 
frequency, duration of use, and age of initial onset (Bolla et al., 2005; Curran, Brignell, 
Fletcher, Middleton, & Henry, 2002; Gonzalez, 2007; Hall, 2014; Morgan, Schafer, Freeman, 
& Curran, 2010; Solowij & Battisti, 2008). For instance, in a study of recreational cannabis 
users Curran et al. (2002) identified greater impairments in cognitive functioning in response 
to higher doses of orally administered THC, with impairments more evident two hours after 
consumption. Furthermore, Bolla et al. (2005) reported that cannabis-related impairments in 
decision-making were also related to frequency of use with greater deficits observed in more 
frequent users. Also, Morgan, Schafer, et al. (2010) observed no memory deficits in users 
who smoked cannabis with higher levels of cannabidiol (CBD; another primary component of 
cannabis) leading to the suggestion that high CBD strains could offset memory impairment 
associated with THC. Interestingly, a number of studies have reported an absence of 
cannabis-related cognitive impairment, despite the observation of altered neurological 
functioning (Chang, Yakupov, Cloak, & Ernst, 2006; Elderth, Matochik, Cadet, & Bolla, 
2004; Filbely et al., 2014; Nestor, Hester, & Garavan, 2010; Schweinsburg, Schweinsburg, 
Nagel, Eyler, & Tapert, 2010). Absences of cognitive impairments have been attributed to 
participant (e.g. substance use history) and methodological factors such as the choice of 
imaging methods (computed tomography, PET, fMRI) and use of a wide variety of different 
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neuropsychological tools. However some studies have proposed that the lack of differences in 
cognitive abilities in the presence of abnormal neural functioning may be the result of 
compensatory mechanisms whereby other brain regions are recruited to assist in the 
execution of cognitive processes (Chang et al., 2006; Elderth et al., 2004; Fibely et al., 2014; 
Nestor et al., 2010; Schweinsburg et al., 2010). Whatever the reason, it is nevertheless 
apparent that the literature relating to cannabis-specific cognitive declines is characterised by 
mixed findings across a range of cognitive processes.  
2.6 The importance of investigating cognitive processing within substance-using samples 
Given the heavy reliance we place on cognitive processes in order to function 
effectively in our daily lives and the fact that compromised cognitive functioning perpetuates 
compulsive drug using behaviour increasing the likelihood of addiction (Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2002; Koob & Volkow, 2010; Volkow & Fowler, 2000), it is clearly important to 
continue to investigate the cognitive profiles associated with substance use. Furthermore, the 
identification of drug specific declines across various stages of consumption could assist in 
the development of more tailored support strategies that take into account reduced cognitive 
abilities. By doing so, improvements in basic day-to-day functioning, as well as increases in 
treatment compliance and prognosis could be achieved.  
2.7 Gaps in the literature regarding cognitive functioning in substance users 
Although a number of cognitive processes have been investigated within the context 
of both opiate and cannabis use, there is one striking omission, namely the capacity to 
mentally time travel into one’s personal future. This process has been referred to by a number 
of labels including future thinking, episodic future thinking, prospection, and episodic 
foresight (Addis et al., 2007; Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Schacter et 
al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). For the purpose of this research project, it will be 
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referred to as episodic foresight. This particular capacity is considered by some to be a 
defining ability separating humans from less evolved species (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) 
and it has recently been the subject of increasing research interest. It shares neurological and 
cognitive overlap with memory and other higher-order processes (Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & 
Schacter, 2010; Addis & Schacter, 2008; D'Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der 
Linden, 2010; D'Argembeau, Xue, Lu, van der Linden, & Bechara, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Schacter et al., 2007) and therefore conditions which bring about impairments in these 
associated domains would likely also be associated with impaired episodic foresight. This 
research project, to our knowledge, is the first investigation of episodic foresight within the 
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CHAPTER 3: Review of episodic foresight literature 
3.1 Definition of mental time travel 
The faculty of mental time travel (MTT) allows humans to reminisce about past 
experiences and entertain possibilities in their personal future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Tulving, 1985, 2002). This process requires disengagement from current experiences in order 
to re-live or pre-live events in the present moment. MTT is phenomenological in nature and 
has immense survival value as present behaviours are informed by the recollection of past 
experiences as well as anticipation of future outcomes. There is now recognition that MTT 
into both the past and future are complementary processes with converging lines of evidence 
consistently highlighting an association between the ability to recall the past (episodic 
memory) and pre-experience the future (episodic foresight).  
3.2 Episodic memory and episodic foresight defined  
Although the human memory system encompasses a catalogue of memory functions, 
it is the episodic memory system which is most implicated in MTT into the past and future 
(Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Tulving, 1972, 1985, 2002). One part of this system is episodic 
memory which is distinguished from other types of memory by its temporal orientation and 
first-person perspective (Tulving, 2002). Unlike semantic memory, which refers to the factual 
knowledge related to the world and not personal experiences, episodic memories refer to 
autobiographically-referenced experiences which are specifically oriented to past (Tulving, 
2002). Referring to the capacity to mentally project the self into the future and pre-experience 
an event, episodic foresight is a uniquely human ability (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; 
Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Schacter et al., 2007). Different from the acknowledgement of a 
future time period, episodic foresight involves pre-living the future through mental 
simulation. Given that future survival is a function of behaviours executed in the present, 
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episodic foresight has immense survival value as it allows for the construction, mental 
enactment, and evaluation of behavioural contingencies before committing to any course of 
action (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). This capacity to generate and work through multiple 
future scenarios allows for the expansion of viable possibilities as well as elimination of less 
appropriate alternatives. The mental simulation of these hypothetical outcomes provides a 
safe environment to test the practicality of options without the risk of harm or unnecessary 
use of physical resources. The autobiographical nature of this memory system is attributed to 
autonoetic consciousness, which is the subjective sense of the self as it extends across time 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 1985, 2002). Without autonoetic consciousness, 
humans are devoid of MTT ability into either the past or indeed the future (Tulving, 2002). 
3.3 Importance of episodic foresight 
The potential functional implications of impaired episodic foresight ability cannot be 
understated given its prominent role in basic day-to-day existence. D'Argembeau et al. (2011) 
highlighted the important role thinking about the future plays in the everyday lives of healthy 
adults, reporting that the frequency of future-oriented thoughts outweighs those about the 
past, with a future thought occurring every 16 minutes. In fact, individuals tend to simulate 
hypothetical future outcomes when engaging in processes central to basic daily functioning 
such as planning, decision making, and problem solving (D'Argembeau et al., 2011). 
However despite the many discussions proposing links between episodic foresight and mental 
processes implicated in functional outcomes (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 
2006; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; D'Argembeau et al., 2010; Schacter et al., 2007; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), this area is lacking in direct empirical evidence. Of the 
studies that have been conducted linking functional capacities and episodic foresight 
specifically most tend to focus on how the mental simulation of future events can lead to 
successful goal attainment by increasing the likelihood of performing intended actions. For 
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example, in a study by Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, and Armor (1998), university students studying 
for an impending mid-term examination were trained to either mentally simulate scenarios of 
themselves studying in a way that could lead them to obtaining an A grade (process-
simulation) or to imagine themselves receiving the A grade (outcome-simulation). Both 
groups were told to engage in these simulations each day in the week leading to the exam. 
The students who executed the process simulations reported more time studying for the exam 
and achieved higher grades on the actual mid-term, in comparison to a matched control 
group; whereas the outcome-simulation group did not benefit from their mental simulations. 
It was proposed that the benefits gained by using process-simulations were in part due to the 
mental simulations facilitating the students to plan for the exam. The rationale behind this is 
that mental simulations of scenarios that involve the execution of future intentions can assist 
in the translation of the intention into an actual behaviour (Gollwitzer, 1993; Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006; Neroni, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2013). Difficulties in the capacity for 
episodic foresight could potentially limit the frequency of behavioural contingencies 
constructed, restricting choice of actions that would potentially achieve desired goals.  
3.4 The role of episodic memory in episodic foresight: the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis 
Recalling the past and imagining the future are both constructive processes requiring 
the assembly of mental scenes. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
episodic foresight involves two main processes, the first of which is a construction phase 
(Addis et al., 2007). In this phase, the simulation of personally relevant future events relies 
heavily on the retrieval of autobiographical memories from the past in order to provide the 
basic building blocks for the construction of novel future scenarios (Schacter et al., 2007). 
The second phase involves inhibiting the tendency to simply recast actual memories and 
requires that the retrieved information be held in mind and flexibly manipulated so that past 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
47 
details are recombined into novel future scenarios (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Referred to as 
the elaboration phase (Addis et al., 2007), this secondary process of recombining past 
information into a novel future experience is critical as it allows for the simulation of 
alternative scenarios without the need for behavioural engagement (Schacter & Addis, 2009). 
The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis was further extended to offer an explanation 
for why the reconstructive nature of episodic memory allows for future event simulation 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007). Specifically, because the recall of past memories is a 
reconstructive process, experiences of past events are not retrieved from memory stores as a 
whole, but rather as pieces of information. When cued, both internally or externally, these 
pieces of information are searched for within memory traces and the whole experience is 
reconstructed from these parts. Therefore, episodic memory assists in episodic foresight by 
making these pieces of information available for assimilation into a novel future scenario. 
There is a considerable body of research confirming the overlap between past and future 
MTT.  
3.5 Assessment of episodic foresight 
Research studies often employ the use of interview tasks to assess episodic foresight 
ability. These commonly involve word-cue techniques in which participants are instructed to 
mentally simulate and describe events personally experienced in the past and imagine 
plausible future events that could occur in their personal future (Atance & O'Neill, 2005; 
Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, & Maguire, 2007).  A widely used 
example of this approach to episodic foresight assessment is the adaptation by Addis et al. 
(2008) of Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Wincour, and Moscovitch’s (2002)  Autobiographical 
Interview (AI). The adapted AI is a semi-structured interview used to assess episodic and 
non-episodic content in two temporal phase conditions (past and future) and therefore 
provides an index of both episodic memory and episodic foresight. Participants are instructed 
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to describe a previously-experienced past event or a novel future event in response to a cue 
word. The events have to refer to a specific time and place, and be described from the 
participant’s subjective perspective, rather than that of an observer. In the Addis et al. (2008) 
version of the measure, 32 cue words are provided across  four temporal conditions (past few 
weeks, past few years, next few weeks, and next few years) and participants are given a limit 
of three minutes to describe each event. Performance on this task is assessed by segmenting 
and categorizing the details generated from the interview as either internal (episodic details 
specific to the central event) or external (non-episodic details including: repetitions, semantic 
information, and information not specific to the central event). The number of internal details 
generated for future events is the primary measure of episodic future thinking and the number 
of internal details for past events indexes episodic memory. 
3.6 Evidence for episodic memory and episodic foresight overlap 
3.6.1 Developmental evidence 
 If there is an overlap between episodic memory and episodic foresight, both abilities 
should begin to emerge and decline in tandem across the life span. In relation to episodic 
memory there is a large body of literature that consistently demonstrates that it is not fully 
developed until a child reaches the age of four (see Atance & Metcalf, 2013 for review). This 
is not to suggest however, that children younger than four years of age have no memory of 
the past. Instead it is suggested that younger aged children have script-like or semantic based 
knowledge of past experiences rather than memories that are truly self-relevant, reflecting a 
lack of autonoetic consciousness.  
The developmental trajectory of episodic foresight has been shown to parallel the 
emergence and decline of episodic memory. For example, Busby and Suddendorf (2005) 
observed similar difficulty in future-oriented thinking when asking three -, four -, and five-
year old children about events they experienced “yesterday”, as well as experiences they 
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might have “tomorrow”. Only a small minority of three year-old children were able to 
successfully provide accurate reports of events they experienced the day prior to testing, or 
would experience the following day. The four and five year-old children performed better 
than the three year-olds on both tasks but there were no differences observed between the 
four year old and five-year olds. Although tentatively proposed, these findings could suggest 
that the capacity for MTT into the past and the future is not yet fully developed in three-year 
children (Busby & Suddendorf, 2005).  
At the other end of the life span, research has identified comparable age-related 
declines in episodic memory and episodic foresight. For example, in a study by Addis et al. 
(2008) using the adapted AI, the authors compared younger and older adults on their ability 
to reconstruct personally experienced events from the past, and simulate novel future events 
that they may experience in their personal future. The temporal distances of the cues were 
constrained so that participants generated descriptions of events within the “past/next few 
weeks/years”. Relative to the younger adult group, the older adults produced fewer internal 
details when remembering the past or imagining the future. This age-related decline in 
episodic foresight was also reported in subsequent studies by Addis et al. (2010) and Rendell 
et al. (2012). Interestingly, these two investigations explained this impairment differently. 
First, Addis et al. (2010) attributed the compromised ability to project into the future to a 
breakdown in the recombination of past information into a novel future scenario. However 
using a different paradigm, Rendell et al. (2012)’s results suggested that a specific 
impairment in the capacity for self-projection, which is the capacity to shift one’s current 
perspective of the immediate environment to a different spatial, mental, temporal alternative 
was the underlying contributor. However despite differences in interpretation, the literature 
has consistently highlighted that both episodic memory and episodic foresight are similarly 
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impacted across stages of development, therefore suggesting neurocognitive overlap between 
these two abilities    
3.6.2 Neurological evidence 
Apart from the findings from developmental studies, a second source of evidence for 
a relationship between episodic memory and episodic foresight comes from neurological 
studies. For example, early evidence for this link between past and future MTT is provided 
by Patient K.C who was the victim of a motorcycle accident at the age of 30 which caused 
extensive brain damage to a number of cortical and subcortical regions resulting in severe 
amnesia (Tulving, 2002). Despite being able to provide many facts about the world and his 
life, Patient K.C was unable to remember subjective experiences of his life, or imagine 
himself in the future. It was concluded that his inability to place himself within either 
temporal context demonstrated insufficient autonoetic consciousness, the defining element of 
episodic memory and episodic foresight. This parallel deficit therefore indicated possible 
neurological overlap between past and future MTT. However, the most explicit evidence of 
the overlap between past and future MTT has resulted from the advancement of 
neuroimaging technology. Investigations exploring possible parallels in brain activity during 
simulation of past and future events were initiated by Okuda et al. (2003) and since then 
numerous imaging studies have followed suit. The following section will discuss evidence 
from three pivotal investigations supporting the neurological overlap between episodic 
memory and episodic foresight.  
In the first, Okuda et al. (2003) used PET and observed activation within the 
prefrontal cortex and two MTL structures (hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus) when 
healthy adults freely recalled and imagined events in the near or far past or future. The MTL 
is a region that is widely known to be involved in learning and memory processes (Squire, 
Stark, & Clark, 2007). The hippocampus is one of the key structures of the MTL and is 
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thought to be responsible for combining disparate elements for the construction of mental 
scenarios (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Studies that have assessed episodic foresight ability in 
amnesic patients with known MTL or hippocampal specific atrophy have demonstrated 
comparable impairments in episodic memory and episodic foresight ability. This not only 
reinforces the overlap between the two capacities, but also strengthens the argument for the 
importance of this area and embedded structures for MTT.  
Similar to Okuda et al. (2003), subsequent investigations by Szpunar, Watson, and 
McDermott (2007) and Addis et al. (2007) also observed overlapping activity within the 
prefrontal cortex and hippocampal regions during both past and future even simulation. 
While Okuda et al. (2003) required patients to freely recall/imagine past/future events, 
Szpunar et al. (2007) and Addis et al. (2007) administered event cues to prompt participant 
recall and future simulation. In the Szpunar et al. (2007) study healthy adult participants were 
instructed to recall a past event, imagine a future event, and also imagine an event involving 
well-known past American president Bill Clinton (which was devoid of any MTT demand). 
fMRI data identified overlapping neurological activity within prefrontal and hippocampal 
regions, as well as activation within the posterior midline region around the precuneus when 
recalling the past and imagining the future event. However, this activation was not present 
when participants imagined the event relating to Bill Clinton. This finding suggests a 
neurological profile specific to MTT into one’s personal past and future.  
Addis et al. (2007) also used fMRI to investigate the neural substrates of episodic 
foresight but extended this exploration to differentiate the neurological activity between the 
construction and elaboration phases proposed in the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis. While lying in a scanner, participants were visually presented with a cue word 
and instructed to silently generate a past or future event to describe (construction). Following 
this, participants were instructed to silently recall or imagine the personal event in as much 
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detail as possible (elaboration). Addis et al. (2007) identified neurological overlap between 
past and future event descriptions during both the construction and elaboration phases. In 
relation to the construction phase, activation in visuospatial and left hippocampal regions was 
observed during the construction of both past and future event simulation. It was posited that 
the activation of the left hippocampus in the early stages of event construction was due to the 
interaction between the visually presented event cues and memory retrieval processes 
involved in searching for and recovering autobiographical memories needed to construct the 
past and future mental scenarios.  
The magnitude of neurological overlap however was far greater during the elaboration 
phase. More specifically, during the elaboration phase, extensive overlap between past and 
future event simulation was identified in the left medial PFC which was expected given that 
this region is known for self-referential information and that participants were explicitly 
instructed to simulate personally relevant past and future events. Widespread activation in the 
bilateral parahippocampal and retrosplenial cortices, posterior cingulate and precuneus was 
also observed when elaborating event details during past and future conditions. These regions 
are also known to support contextual processing, self-reflection, integration of emotions and 
memory, and episodic imagery; all of which can support the elaboration of details related to a 
personal event. Particularly interesting however was the finding that right hippocampal 
activation was additionally observed during future event construction but not past event 
reconstruction. This differential activation of the right hippocampus was attributed to the 
integration of disparate details into a future event, which is an additional demand not required 
for memory recall. 
Overall, despite slight variations in assessment across these investigations, it appears 
that activation within the prefrontal cortex and MTL structures have been consistently 
observed during memory recall and future event simulation, reinforcing the idea of a specific 
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core network that is involved in mental time travel into the past and future (Addis et al., 
2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007).  
3.7 Other processes involved in episodic foresight 
Although there is strong support for the role of episodic memory in episodic foresight, 
episodic foresight involves more than recalling the past and thus requires more cognitive 
effort (Arnold, McDermott, & Szpunar, 2011). Evidence for the additional processing 
requirements of episodic foresight is provided by studies of clinical populations that have 
demonstrated asymmetric performance on episodic memory and foresight tasks, with 
episodic foresight impairments not shown to be secondary to episodic memory impairment 
(de Vito et al., 2012; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012). Other abilities that have been 
proposed to contribute to episodic foresight include executive functioning (D'Argembeau et 
al., 2010; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). This is because episodic foresight requires the 
flexible manipulation of past information into a new time period and it also involves the 
capacity to inhibit the simple recasting of retrieved memories (Schacter & Addis, 2007). In 
addition, processes such as scene construction, self-projection, and narrative ability have also 
been implicated in episodic foresight ability (Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Gaesser, Sacchetti, 
Addis, & Schacter, 2011; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al., 2007). Each of these will now be 
considered in detail in terms of their respective contribution to episodic foresight. 
3.7.1 The role of executive functions in episodic foresight 
Executive functions refer to higher-order cognitions that involve multiple processes 
and complex brain networks (Carpenter, Just, & Reichle, 2000). These higher-order 
cognitions are goal directed and allow for adaptive planning and successful problem solving 
(Carpenter et al., 2000). Executive functions include planning, inhibitory control, task 
switching, cognitive flexibility and performance monitoring, with deficits in such processes 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
54 
indicative of frontal lobe dysfunction (Carpenter et al., 2000). Given the identified 
involvement of prefrontal regions in both episodic foresight and executive processes, as well 
as the complex nature of episodic foresight, it has been suggested that the ability to mentally 
project into the future is at least to some extent reliant on these higher-order cognitions 
(Addis et al., 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2006; D'Argembeau et al., 2010; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). However, despite this sound rationale, the exact role of executive processes 
in episodic foresight is largely unknown. Indeed, there is limited research directly 
investigating the role of executive function in episodic foresight, and the research that has 
been conducted reports inconsistent findings.   
One of the few studies that has explored the role of executive processes in the 
capacity to mentally simulate novel future scenarios was conducted by D'Argembeau et al. 
(2010). In that study, the authors attempted to identify the individual contributions of a range 
of possible component processes that might be involved in episodic foresight including 
executive processes. Executive functioning was indexed by performance on verbal and non-
verbal fluency tasks. These two tasks were combined following principal components factor 
analysis before being correlated with measures of episodic foresight. Fluency tasks impose 
particular demands on executive processes in order to initiate, organise and monitor the 
retrieval of information. The findings from D'Argembeau et al. (2010) identified involvement 
of executive processes in the recall of episodic memories as well as in the simulation of novel 
future scenarios. However there was a differential finding, with executive processes 
correlating with the level of specificity in event details only when describing future events 
and not when describing past events. The interpretation of these findings by D'Argembeau et 
al. (2010) was twofold. First, they concluded that executive processes appear to play a 
general support role in “accessing and representing autobiographical knowledge” (pg. 816). 
Second, unlike pre-experienced memories of the past, future events are not restricted to any 
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particular spatiotemporal context and as a result there are an infinite number of possible 
future experiences that can be simulated. Consequently, the construction of novel future 
events would require multiple searches within memory stores in order to retrieve specific 
details unique to the future event being constructed. Also, monitoring of information being 
searched through within memory stores is necessary for future simulation in order to 
differentiate between relevant and irrelevant details. This is different to the retrieval of past 
experiences as these events have a precise spatiotemporal signature, which would not require 
as many search cycles, therefore not requiring the level of support from executive functions 
as imagining the future.  
Investigations of clinical groups with specific neurological atrophy and identified 
episodic foresight impairment have also provided evidence for the role of executive processes 
in the capacity to project the self into the future. A study by de Vito et al. (2012) of 32 
patients diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) supported the findings of D'Argembeau et 
al. (2010). de Vito et al. (2012) used a reduced version of the adapted AI (16 cue words as 
opposed to 32) to assess mental simulation of past and future events, and also included an 
atemporal condition to assess the patients’ capacity to construct mental scenes in the absence 
of any temporal element. This condition involved providing participants with short verbal 
sentences defining ordinary scenarios (e.g. Imagine you are standing in an open field by the 
banks of a river) and instructing them to provide a description of that experience in as much 
detail as possible. Executive function was measured using the Frontal Assessment Battery 
(FAB) (Dubois et al., 2000). This tool assesses six cognitive processes related to frontal lobe 
functioning including conceptualization of knowledge, mental flexibility, and inhibitory 
control. The findings of this investigation demonstrated that relative to a healthy control 
group, the PD patients had a selective impairment in episodic foresight, which was not 
secondary to episodic memory impairment or the inability to construct atemporal mental 
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scenarios. Instead, the authors attributed the episodic foresight deficits to executive 
dysfunction. This claim was strengthened by further investigation of a subset of seven PD 
patients who performed the poorest on the episodic foresight task and who were then 
compared to the rest of the group. The groups were compared on their performances on the 
Frontal Assessment Battery performance and findings demonstrated that these seven patients 
had significantly poorer executive functions than the rest of the group.  
It was posited by de Vito et al. (2012) that although PD patients were able to access 
and retrieve memories that could be used to construct novel future scenarios, they were 
unable to suppress the prepotent tendency to simply recall past. The authors suggested that 
this resulted in compromised ability to assimilate past information into construction of the 
future. They attributed this lack of ability to fragment retrieved memories for use in future 
event construction to reduced executive processes.  
A second study indicating a possible link between executive processes and episodic 
foresight was conducted by Squire et al. (2010). They administered the adapted AI to a 
sample of patients with lesions that were limited to the hippocampus. Given that the 
hippocampus is one of the key structures that comprise the core network arguably 
underpinning MTT (Schacter et al., 2007), it was postulated that atrophy in this region should 
produce specific impairments in MTT. However, the authors found that the patients’ capacity 
to reconstruct autobiographical memories and simulate plausible future events was intact and 
therefore suggested that impairments in simulating the future were attributable to 
neurocognitive dysfunction outside of the hippocampus, including frontal cortices which are 
involved in executive processing. The authors concluded that the hippocampus is not as 
crucial to MTT as it had been widely accepted, and that declines in the capacity to reconstruct 
the past or construct one’s personal future can be attributed at least in part to dysfunction in 
areas that govern executive processes.  
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Further potential support for the involvement of executive processes in episodic 
foresight was provided by Irish, Hodges, and Piguet (2013). Also using the adapted AI, the 
authors assessed patients with the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) 
on their capacity for past and future event simulation. This neurodegenerative disorder had 
previously been linked to significant declines in a number of cognitive processes including 
autobiographical memory, which were attributed to executive and frontopolar dysfunction, 
but episodic foresight had not been investigated. This investigation identified an episodic 
foresight deficit within the context of bvFTD and also identified a neurological distinction 
between past and future event simulation. Specifically, recollection of past memories was 
reliant on the medial PFC, whereas the simulation of future events was driven by frontopolar, 
lateral temporal, and medial temporal areas. These findings not only provide evidence for the 
increased cognitive demand of episodic foresight relative to episodic memory, but also for the 
involvement of frontal regions in the capacity for future thought which also underpin 
executive processing. However, it should be noted that in this study performance on past and 
future event simulations did not correlate with measures of executive processes including the 
Verbal Letter Fluency test, the Trail Making test (cognitive switching), and the Hayling 
Sentence Completion test (cognitive inhibition). The authors suggested that the neuroimaging 
findings reinforced the notion that episodic foresight is a complex ability that requires the 
involvement of various cognitive processes. However the lack of significant association 
between episodic foresight and performance on executive functioning measures led the 
authors to suggest that the higher-order cognitions needed for future event simulation may 
not have been assessed in this particular investigation.  
A lack of association between episodic foresight and executive functioning has 
however also been reported in some other clinical groups with compromised episodic 
foresight ability. For instance, although Addis et al. (2008) speculated about the involvement 
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of executive processes in the age-related declines in episodic foresight, correlational analyses 
did not reveal significant relationships between measures of executive processes and future 
event simulation. Furthermore, in a study of patients with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder no 
association was found between the ability to project into the future (as measured by the 
adapted AI), and executive functioning (verbal fluency) in either the clinical or the control 
group (Brown et al., 2014). Child studies have also produced similar findings. For example, 
given that episodic foresight requires the capacity to switch between and compare different 
memories before electing the most relevant to be used in the simulation of a future event, 
Terrett et al. (2013) used a measure of cognitive switching from the executive function 
domain of the NEPSY II in their study of MTT in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD). Although the ASD group demonstrated compromised MTT into the past and future, 
there were no differences in executive functioning as indexed by cognitive switching, and it 
did not contribute to episodic foresight in either the clinical or the control group.  Similarly, 
another study of children’s capacity for episodic foresight revealed a lack of correlation 
between a measure of executive processing and episodic foresight after controlling for age 
and general cognitive ability (Hanson, Atance, & Paluck, 2014).  
The inconsistent findings to date relating to the role of executive functions in episodic 
foresight may be attributed to a number of factors, particularly relating to variations in 
methodology. First, although many studies employ the use of the adapted AI, a number of 
modifications have been applied across investigations. For instance, there are differences in 
the use of, types, frequency, and administration of cues. Second, across the studies the 
number and type of assessments employed to measure executive processes vary significantly 
which may contribute to the differences in findings. For example, D'Argembeau et al. (2010) 
used measures of verbal fluency to represent executive processes and found that this ability 
contributed to episodic foresight, whereas Terrett et al. (2013) administered one measure of 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE 
 
59 
executive functioning (assessing switching) and did not find any association between any of 
the executive processes and episodic foresight in a group of autistic children or the typically 
developing comparison group. These methodological differences therefore  reduce the ability 
to make direct comparison between studies and their findings.  
Despite the variability in findings regarding the role of executive functioning in 
episodic foresight, it is generally accepted that it is a complex process which requires the 
involvement of a number of cognitive abilities in order to create, mentally project, and pre-
experience a novel future event.  Although the roles of episodic memory and executive 
processes have been a focal discussion points within the literature, other possible contributors 
have also been proposed including the capacities of scene construction and self-projection 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, 
et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Although both of these abilities have been 
implicated in episodic foresight ability, the development of the now widely used paradigm by 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) has allowed for the deconstruction of identified 
episodic foresight deficits in various clinical groups which helps shed light on their relative 
contributions.  
3.7.2 Self-projection, scene construction, and narrative ability 
Buckner and Carroll (2006) place particular focus on the process of self-projection as 
being important for a number of mental processes including episodic memory, episodic 
foresight, spatial navigation, and theory of mind. Self-projection refers to the ability to shift 
between one’s current perspective of the immediate environment and a different spatial, 
mental, or temporal alternative. However this proposal has been described as somewhat broad 
and does not specifically apply to MTT. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) refined the concept 
of self-projection by focusing on the specific capacity to project oneself backwards and 
forwards in time, rather than simply changing one’s perspective.  This emphasis on the 
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capacity to project the self through time is reminiscent of the proposal by Tulving (1985) that 
MTT requires an awareness of the self within different temporal dimensions.  
In contrast, Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) proposed a theory that 
acknowledges, but de-emphasizes the involvement of self-projection for cognitive faculties 
including episodic memory and episodic foresight and instead places most focus on the 
ability for scene construction. Scene construction refers to the process of building an 
imagined scenario in our mind. Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) proposed that scene 
construction is the common underlying process that episodic memory and episodic foresight 
rely on. Scene construction can be differentiated from simple visual imagery as it involves 
mentally generating and combining multiple elements such as contextual details, sensory 
details, thoughts, people, and objects, in order to create a coherent, spatial representation of 
an imagined scene (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al., 
2007). Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire (2007) have argued that scene construction and self-
projection abilities are governed by two discernible neurological substrates, and suggest that 
the hippocampus is primarily responsible for scene construction (in terms of combining 
disparate information retrieved from memory systems), and the anterior medial prefrontal 
cortex, posterior cingulate gyrus, and precuneus are responsible for the capacity to project the 
self through time and other self-referential processes involved in MTT. Hassabis, Kumaran, 
and Maguire (2007) do however acknowledge the involvement of self-projection and other 
self-referential processes in episodic memory and episodic foresight but suggest that these 
self-referenced components are additional contributions to the basic ability to construct 
mental scenes, which is required for a number of cognitive operations such as planning, 
imagination, and navigation.  
Referring to the capacity to verbally communicate mental simulations effectively, 
narrative ability is another processes proposed to be involved in mental time-travel 
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(Corballis, 2009). However the contribution of narrative ability for mental-time travel is 
currently not fully understood. Race, Keane, and Verfaellie (2011, 2013, 2015) assessed the 
narrative ability of amnesic patients with lesions restricted to the MTL. The authors observed 
that despite the amnesic patient’s impoverished narrative ability when describing past 
memories or novel future experiences, their narrative ability when describing an event based 
on pictorial cues remained intact. This was evidenced by the comparable number of episodic 
details generated by the patients relative to healthy control groups (Race et al. 2011, 2013). 
Despite subsequent findings identifying qualitative differences in these narratives, where 
descriptions by the amnesic patients were less coherent (Race et al. 2015), the authors 
concluded that deficits in mental time travel displayed by amnesic patients are not secondary 
to impaired narrative ability (race et al. 2011, 2013). In contrast, Zeman, Beschin, Dewar and 
Della Sala (2013) did report impaired narrative ability of amnesic patients in comparison to a 
healthy control group. However, their sample of amnesic patients was not as homogenous as 
the sample recruited by Race et al (2011, 2013, 2015), with additional lesions outside of the 
MTL, and cognitive impairments in domains other than memory. These studies have 
provided further evidence for the role of the MTL in mental time-travel, but highlight the 
need for more exploration of the contribution of narrative ability to  this ability within healthy 
and clinical groups. Many studies that attempt to differentiate the contributions of each of 
these processes use the paradigm developed by Hassabis and colleagues. The following 
section will explain this paradigm in more detail.  
3.7.3 Disentangling episodic foresight deficits using the paradigm developed by 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007)  
As previously noted, many investigations relating to the episodic foresight ability in 
adults have used cue word interview type formats that have required descriptions of past and 
future events (e.g. Adapted AI). However, in their investigation assessing bilateral 
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hippocampal amnesic patient’s ability to imagine new experiences, Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vaan, et al. (2007) developed an imagination task to explore the involvement of different 
component processes. Similar to the Adapted AI, this paradigm uses verbal cues as prompts. 
However instead of asking participants to recall previously-experienced past events and 
imagine themselves experiencing future events in response to single words, participants are 
instructed to complete three imagination tasks based on scenario cues for one atemporal 
event, a future event, as well as complete a narrative task. Also like the Adapted AI, 
participants are instructed to imagine and describe themselves experiencing these situations. 
By adopting this approach Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) suggested it would be 
possible to disentangles the contributions of scene construction and self-projection to the 
imagination of new experiences 
3.6.3.1 Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) paradigm cues 
As noted, this paradigm is comprised of three types of scenario cues. The atemporal 
event condition involves participant reorganizing the existing information from memory to 
create a novel, fictitious scenario in a familiar context (e.g. drinking a coffee in a pub/bar). 
This does not require MTT and therefore arguably reflects scene construction ability. In fact, 
participants are explicitly instructed not to simply recall an actual pre-lived experience of 
being in the scenario. While it could be argued that the imagination of everyday scenes relies 
on recent episodic memories, the use of familiar, commonplace, scenarios as cues was 
specifically selected because knowledge of these scenarios is based on semantic information 
which has been collected over time through one’s experience. Therefore participants are able 
to generate a mental construction without needing to relate it to a specific personal 
experience. The future event condition explicitly instructs participants to imagine 
experiencing a possible event in the future (e.g. Imagine how you will spend next Christmas). 
Unlike the atemporal cues, the future cues have an additional demand for MTT, and therefore 
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require autonoetic consciousness. Finally, the narrative task provides participants with a 
story structure on which to base their description of an event. Similar to the atemporal task, 
the narrative task requires scene construction ability but has no MTT demand; therefore it 
does not require autonoetic consciousness. However the difference between the narrative and 
atemporal tasks is that the narrative task makes the lowest demands on imagination by 
providing the participant with a detailed story structure on which to base their description. 
The inclusion of the narrative task therefore provides an important means of testing whether 
any difficulties on this interview-format task simply reflect poor narrative ability.  
Although all three conditions are self-referent and require some degree of scene 
construction, the variations between the three tasks allow the disentangling of which abilities 
might be specifically compromised in episodic foresight. For instance, the future condition is 
the only task that involves the additional element of imagining a subjective sense of self in 
time (autonoetic consciousness) and therefore difficulties on this task in comparison to the 
other two would suggest that episodic foresight deficits reflect particular problems with the 
self-projection component of this process. The original protocol involves six atemporal, three 
future, and one narrative cue (see Table 1) but a number of studies have administered 
variations of the paradigm to clinical groups with already established impairments in episodic 
foresight when attempting to disentangle the roles of scene construction and self-projection in 
that ability (D'Argembeau et al., 2010; de Vito et al., 2012; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 
2014; Raffard et al., 2010). This paradigm has been valuable in highlighting the fact that 








Details of the 10 Scenario Cues used in the original Hassabis Paradigm 
Atemporal 
scenarios 
1. Imagine you’re lying on a deserted white sandy beach in a beautiful tropical bay 
 2. Imagine you’re standing in the busy main hall of a museum containing many 
impressive exhibits 
 3. Imagine you’re sitting having a drink in a pub 
 4. Imagine you’re standing in on the deck of a ship that’s pulling out of port on the 
beginning of a voyage 
 5. Imagine you’re standing by a small stream somewhere deep in a forest 
 6. Imagine you’re standing in the middle of a bustling street market 
Future 
scenarios 
7. Imagine something you will be doing this weekend, but just give me one event 
 8. Imagine how you will spend next Christmas 
 9. Imagine the next time you’ll meet a friend 
Narrative 
scenario 
10. Imagine you are standing in the middle of the impressive high vaulted entrance 
hall of a mediaeval castle. There is a tower somewhere in the castle, the top of which 
is accessed via a circular winding staircase. I want you to describe to me in as much 
detail as possible your route through the castle’s many rooms and floors until you 
reach the top of the tower. Use all your senses including what you see, feel, and do 
on the way to the tower. 
 
3.7.4 Evidence of a link between episodic foresight impairment and scene 
construction deficits 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) were the first to demonstrate an association 
between episodic foresight impairment and scene construction deficits in a group of amnesic 
individuals with bilateral hippocampal damage. Not only were patients in this study unable to 
recall the past or imagine novel future experiences, but Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. 
(2007) also observed no difference between the ability to construct atemporal and future 
scenarios. This finding led the authors to conclude that the hippocampus mediates the 
capacity for scene construction by supporting the binding of disparate elements of an 
experience into a holistic scenario, which is a key function that underpins MTT into the past 
and future. 
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Raffard et al. (2010) provided further support for the role of scene construction in 
episodic foresight. First, these authors confirmed the schizophrenia-related episodic foresight 
deficit established by D'Argembeau, Raffard, et al. (2008). Second, the schizophrenia group 
performed less well on both the scene construction and self-projection conditions of the 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) paradigm, relative to healthy control participants, but 
they did not find the future condition any more difficult than the atemporal condition. This 
led to the conclusion that impairments in MTT within the context of schizophrenia were at 
least in part attributable to deficits in scene construction ability.  
Individuals with ASD represent another clinical group that has been investigated in 
relation to episodic foresight and its underlying mechanisms. For example, Lind and Bowler 
(2010) initially observed parallel deficits in episodic memory and foresight abilities within 
the context of hig-functioning ASD. Although both the control and ASD groups found future 
event simulation more demanding that memory recall, the adults diagnosed with ASD 
demonstrated compromised abilities in the recall of past episodic memories and imagination 
of novel future personal event details relevant to normal controls. Lind and Bowler (2010) 
postulated that this inability to MTT into the past and future might be explained by an failure 
to bind the separate bits of retrieved information into a holistic reconstruction of personal past 
events or simulation of plausible future events which are rich in contextual details. Lind and 
Bowler (2010) attributed this deficit to limitations in the episodic buffer within working 
memory. This refers to a mental space which provides a temporary storage facility where the 
binding of information from different memory systems occur (Baddeley, 1992). This process 
is strikingly reminiscent of Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al.’s (2007) description of the 
process of scene construction. In a subsequent investigation conducted by the same research 
group (Lind et al., 2014), adults diagnosed with hig-functioning ASD completed an 
assessment similar to the original Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) paradigm to assess 
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episodic foresight and atemporal scene construction, with the inclusion of a recall task to 
assess episodic memory. A separate task was also included to assess narrative ability. The 
findings of this investigation identified that the adults diagnosed with ASD had compromised 
ability across all domains. Relative to the control group, the adults with ASD were unable to 
recall personal past events (episodic memory), imagine plausible future events (episodic 
foresight), or imagine atemporal fictions events (scene construction). These deficits were not 
secondary to narrative ability as there were no differences in narrative task performance 
between the two experimental groups. The findings of impaired episodic memory and 
episodic foresight are similar to those of previous studies that have also demonstrated deficits 
in MTT within the context of ASD. However the particularly notable finding of this 
investigation was that the impairment in MTT in adults with ASD appeared to be 
underpinned by a diminished capacity for scene construction. Successful completion of all 
three experimental conditions required intact scene construction ability. Given that the ASD 
group demonstrated compromised ability across all three conditions, the findings provide 
evidence that basic scene construction ability appears necessary for MTT in both temporal 
directions and that impairment in this basic process may be sufficient to cause ASD related 
deficits. 
3.7.5 Evidence that episodic foresight impairment can be linked to self-projection 
deficits 
While a theoretical rationale can be posited, the empirical evidence supporting a role 
for self-projection in episodic foresight is scarce. Indeed only one study with older adults has 
reported a link between deficits in simulating future experiences and specific impairments in 
self-projection (Rendell et al., 2012). In this study Rendell et al. (2012) administered the 
original protocol developed by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, et al. (2007) to a group of young 
(18 to 27 years old) and a group of older (65+ years old) adults in order to disentangle age-
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related differences in episodic foresight. As expected, relative to the younger adults the older 
adults performed less well on all of the imagination tasks (narrative, scene-construction, and 
self-projection). However the ability to provide contextually rich descriptions of future 
scenarios was disproportionately impaired in the older group. Thus this study not only 
identified age-related declines in episodic foresight but also showed that this deficit appeared 
linked to compromised self-projection ability.  
The literature relating to episodic foresight in the context of clinical groups, and the 
components that underpin this ability is not clear-cut. Evidently there is a need for future 
studies to clarify not only which clinical groups are impaired in this ability, but also to 
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Chapter 4: Introduction to Article 1 
4.1 Title 
Episodic foresight deficits in long term opiate users 
4.2 Objectives 
There is strong evidence demonstrating adverse neurocognitive outcomes within the 
context of chronic opiate use which give rise to impairments in cognitive processes that are 
imperative to adaptive independent living. Neuroimaging studies have identified structural 
and functional abnormalities within the prefrontal and temporal regions which are areas 
heavily involved in higher-order cognitions and memory, respectively. Although there are a 
number of cognitions associated with long-term opiate use, episodic foresight, a cognition 
closely related to memory, has not yet been directly assessed in any substance-using 
population.  
Referring to the capacity to mentally time travel into the future and pre-experience 
novel scenarios, episodic foresight has demonstrated significant adaptive value as it allows 
for the construction of scenarios in our mind’s eye which can be hypothetically worked 
through before execution. The literature has provided strong evidence that this complex 
ability is reliant on episodic memory to provide the building blocks for future event 
construction; as well as executive control to assist in the assimilation of retrieved 
information. Episodic foresight can play a role in the planning of future goals as well as 
within decision making processes which see the fulfilment of long term needs given priority 
over choices leading to short term or immediate gratification.  
A breakdown in episodic foresight may cause significant difficulties in everyday 
functioning given that the frequency of future-oriented thoughts outweighs thoughts that 
require recall of past experiences. This could pose particular difficulties for individuals being 
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treated for substance dependence. Indeed, compromised episodic foresight ability may help 
explain, at least in part, the extremely high relapse rates associated with chronic opiate use, 
given that many relapse prevention protocols heavily rely on future-oriented thinking.  
The primary aim of this first study was to directly assess episodic foresight ability in 
the context of chronic opiate use. The secondary aim was to explore whether any identified 
deficit could be attributed to impaired episodic memory and/or executive control given the 
neurological overlap with memory, and evidence suggesting involvement of complex higher-
order cognitions in this ability. 
4.3 Method 
To assess episodic foresight the Adapted Autobiographical Interview was 
administered to 45 opiate-dependent individuals currently engaged in opiate substitution 
treatment, and 45 demographically matched control participants. The primary eligibility 
criterion for the opiate user group was current enrolment in an opiate substitution program 
(e.g. methadone). The opiate user group was recruited from Melbourne-based pharmacies and 
health services which dispensed opiate substitution treatment. Control participants were 
recruited from the general population through social contacts of the researchers.  
Three measures of executive control were completed by all participants and episodic 
foresight was assessed using the Adapted Autobiographical Interview, which also provided 
an index of episodic memory. Participants were required to recall and describe events from 
their personal past (episodic memory) as well as construct novel future scenarios (episodic 
foresight). Interviews were independently transcribed and then scored for two types of 
details. Higher numbers of internal (episodic, related to event being described) details 
produced in the future conditions indicated better episodic foresight ability.  
 
 




Relative to controls, the opiate use group generated significantly fewer internal details 
when imagining the future but not when recalling the past. The opiate group performed less 
well than controls on only one measure of executive function which assessed cognitive 
inhibition. The results also provided support for the overlap between episodic memory and 
episodic foresight with significant relationships found for both experimental groups. 
However contrary to some previous literature no relationships between episodic foresight and 
executive control were found.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This study is the first to directly assess episodic foresight ability in the context of 
substance use. The findings suggest that although this group were capable of retrieving past 
details, they were not able to assimilate that information to construct novel future scenarios. 
These findings may have implications for the modification of relapse prevention strategies 
that rely on future-oriented thought processes. The absence of memory impairment despite 
the observed episodic foresight deficit in the opiate group also paves the way for future 
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CHAPTER 5: Article 1 
 
 
Episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users 
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CHAPTER 6: Introduction to Article 2 
6.1 Title 
Exploring episodic foresight deficits in long term opiate users 
6.2 Objective 
Episodic foresight is a complex cognitive process. Although the relationship between 
episodic foresight and episodic memory has been consistently supported in the literature 
(Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007) clinical groups have 
demonstrated specific impairments in episodic foresight which are not secondary to episodic 
memory deficits (de Vito et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012; Mercuri et al., 2014). As a result, the 
literature has begun to investigate the influences of other contributing factors including scene 
construction and self-projection.  
Scene construction refers to the ability to generate mental scenarios in one’s mind 
irrespective of temporal context, whereas self-projection refers to the capacity to shift 
between alternative perspectives; for instance, different time periods. There is evidence to 
support the possible contribution of scene construction and self-projection to the impairment 
in episodic foresight deficit observed in chronic opiate users. Episodic foresight deficits 
identified in other clinical groups who have demonstrated similar patterns of impairment as 
observed in chronic opiate users, have been attributed to either scene-construction or self-
projection deficits. Therefore the primary aim of the second study was to investigate whether 
deficits in scene construction and self-projection might underpin the compromised ability to 
mentally project the self into the future displayed by long-term opiate users.  
6.3 Method 
A modification of the adapted Autobiographical Interview (AI) used in the preceding 
study was administered to 35 long-term opiate users currently enrolled in an opiate 
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substitution treatment and 35 demographically matched controls. A portion of this sample 
was recruited from Study 1.  
In this study the modified AI did not include the recall component. Rather, it included 
the original future condition (to assess self-projection) and two other imagination conditions 
(to assess narrative ability and scene construction). Interview transcripts were scored using 
the same procedures followed in the preceding study.  
6.4 Results 
The initial between-groups analysis revealed that the opiate user group performed 
significantly worse than the control group on the narrative task that required describing a 
story based on a predefined structure, as well as on the imagination task that required 
imagining the future. This initial finding suggested that impairments in episodic foresight 
may be underpinned simply by poor narrative ability. However to further explore this result, 
two within-group analyses were conducted to examine the how each experimental group 
performed across the three imagination conditions. These data highlighted that both groups 
performed better on the narrative task than either the scene construction and self-projection 
tasks. However, the opiate user group performed significantly worse when asked to engage in 
describing the future event than when instructed to engage in describing an atemporal event. 
This was not the case for the control group who performed comparably across the two 
conditions. These data suggest that a specific inability to mentally project the self into the 
future (which requires the capacity for self-projection) may underlie the episodic foresight 
deficit identified in chronic opiate users. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Given the extremely high rates of relapse reported in this clinical group, the findings 
of this study reinforce the importance of reassessing current relapse prevention protocols that 
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particularly rely on the client’s capacity to project themselves into novel future scenarios. 
This study proposes that relapse prevention should focus on achieving short-term, rather than 
long-term, treatment goals in order to reduce the demand for self-projection into unfamiliar 
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CHAPTER 7: Article 2 
 
Deconstructing the nature of episodic foresight deficits associated with chronic opiate 
use. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the interview task as a 
function of group status (control group, n = 35; opiate-user group, n = 35) and imagination 
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Abstract 
Episodic foresight refers to the capacity to mentally travel forward in time, and has been 
linked to a wide variety of important functional behaviours. Evidence has recently emerged 
that chronic opiate use is associated with deficits in this critical capacity, and that these 
difficulties are not simply a secondary consequence of broader cognitive dysfunction. The 
current study aimed to better understand the circumstances in which chronic opiate users 
might be expected to have problems with episodic foresight, by addressing whether deficits 
reflect compromised scene construction, self-projection, or narrative ability. Thirty-five 
chronic opiate users and 35 demographically matched controls completed an imagination task 
in which they were instructed to imagine and provide descriptions of an atemporal event (to 
assess scene construction), a plausible, self-relevant future event (to additionally assess self-
projection); as well as complete a narrative task (to test whether any difficulties simply reflect 
poor narrative ability). Consistent with prior literature, chronic opiate users exhibited reduced 
capacity for episodic foresight relative to controls. However, the present study was the first to 
show that these difficulties were independent of capacity for scene construction and narration. 
Instead, a specific impairment in self-projection appears to contribute to the problems with 
episodic foresight seen in this clinical group. Deficits in self-projection may have important 
implications in therapeutic environments given that many relapse prevention strategies rely 
heavily on the ability to project oneself into an unfamiliar future, free of problem substance 
use.  
Keywords: Episodic foresight, episodic future thinking, opiate users, Autobiographical 
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Introduction 
Chronic opiate use is associated with poor functional, social, and economic outcomes 
(Hser et al., 2009; Villeux et al., 2010) and relapse following rehabilitation is common 
(Smyth et al., 2010). A recent study of long-term opiate users identified impairment in this 
group on a key cognitive ability, episodic foresight (Mercuri et al., 2014), that may help 
explain these functional difficulties and high relapse rates. Episodic foresight refers to the 
ability to mentally project oneself into the future and pre-experience events (Atance and 
O'Neill, 2001). It is a uniquely human characteristic that has immense survival value as it 
allows for the construction, mental enactment, and evaluation of future scenarios before 
deciding on the course of action most likely to achieve desired outcomes (Addis et al., 2007; 
Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Not surprisingly then, 
episodic foresight has been strongly linked to independent living and a wide variety of 
adaptive behaviors (Suddendorf and Henry, 2013). Indeed, the importance of episodic 
foresight for successful daily living is reinforced by observations that a number of clinical 
groups with known functional difficulties present with significant impairment in this capacity, 
including individuals with autism (Lind and Bowler, 2010; Terrett et al., 2013), schizophrenia 
(Raffard et al., 2010), Parkinson’s disease (de Vito et al., 2012), medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
damage (Race et al., 2011), and hippocampal amnesia (Hassabis et al., 2007b).  
In the context of chronic opiate use, it therefore seems likely that any reduction in the 
capacity for episodic foresight will also have important implications for functional outcomes. 
For instance, difficulties with episodic foresight may have an impact on a client’s prospects 
of successful rehabilitation given that many relapse prevention protocols involve asking 
clients to imagine themselves in future situations of temptation and generate strategies to 
prevent future lapses into problem drug use. Thus, impairment in this ability may directly 
limit treatment success and consequently increase the likelihood of relapse. It is therefore 
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crucial that we develop a clearer picture of the nature of this deficit, including addressing the 
key question of whether all, or only specific aspects of episodic foresight are disrupted in 
long-term opiate users. Developing a more nuanced understanding of when and why this 
complex cognitive capacity is likely to break down will allow for the provision of more 
effective support for daily living and more tailored rehabilitation services.  
According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, episodic foresight is a 
constructive process that involves two main phases. The first is a construction phase in which 
the simulation of personally relevant future events relies heavily on the retrieval of personally 
relevant memories of the past (episodic memory) to provide the basic building blocks for the 
construction of novel future scenarios (Schacter et al., 2007). The second phase involves 
inhibiting the tendency to simply retrieve actual memories and requires that the retrieved 
information be held in mind and flexibly manipulated so that past details are recombined into 
novel future events (Schacter and Addis, 2007). Referred to as the elaboration phase (Addis 
et al., 2007), this secondary process of recombining past information into a novel future 
experience is critical as it allows for the simulation of alternative scenarios without the need 
for behavioral engagement (Schacter and Addis, 2009).  
Clearly episodic foresight is a complex process and one which imposes demands on 
many different cognitive operations. While the role of episodic memory has traditionally 
attracted most attention (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007), other 
contributing cognitive processes have also been proposed including semantic memory (Irish 
et al., 2012) and executive functioning (D'Argembeau et al., 2010; de Vito et al., 2012). 
Others have pointed to the potential importance of scene construction, and self-projection 
(Hassabis et al., 2007a, Hassabis et al., 2007b), and in the present study we will assess 
whether deficits in these latter two abilities contribute to the episodic foresight difficulties 
previously identified in chronic opiate users (Mercuri et al., 2014).  
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Scene construction refers to the process of building an imagined scenario in our mind. 
Different from visual imagery, scene construction involves mentally generating and 
combining multiple elements (e.g. contextual details, sensory details, thoughts, people, and 
objects) to create a coherent, spatial representation of an imagined scene (Hassabis et al., 
2007a; Hassabis et al., 2007b). According to Hassabis et al. (2007b) this ability underpins a 
number of mental processes including spatial navigation and imagining fictitious experiences 
as well as mental time travel in both temporal directions (past and future). It has also been 
suggested however that re-experiencing the past and pre-experiencing the future require the 
additional capacity of self-projection (Buckner and Carroll, 2006). This refers to the ability to 
shift between one’s immediate environment and an alternative perspective, such as a different 
spatial, mental, (or in the case of time travel) temporal perspective, and for that alternative 
perspective to be self-referenced (Buckner and Carroll, 2006).  A number of studies have 
attempted to disentangle the roles of scene construction and self-projection in episodic 
foresight in a number of groups who have established episodic foresight deficits (e.g. 
D'Argembeau et al., 2010; de Vito et al., 2012; Lind et al., 2014; Raffard et al., 2010; Rendell 
et al., 2012).  
Only one study to date has investigated the capacity for episodic foresight in the 
context of chronic opiate use, and as noted, the results showed that the ability to mentally 
travel forward in time is disrupted (Mercuri et al., 2014). This finding aligns with  
neuroimaging evidence that has consistently shown chronic opiate use to be associated with 
abnormalities in temporal regions including the medial temporal lobe (MTL; Cheng et al., 
2013; Fu et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012), the neural regions that have been 
most strongly linked to episodic foresight (see Suddendorf and Henry, 2013 for review). In 
particular, it has been suggested that the hippocampus is especially involved in the binding of 
retrieved information for the construction of a mental scene (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). 
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Consequently, abnormalities in this area might be expected to particularly disrupt the capacity 
for scene construction. However, at a cellular level chronic opiate use accelerates natural 
aging processes, with the MTL atrophy observed in chronic opiate users mimicking that of 
healthy older adults (Cheng et al., 2013).  Given that episodic foresight deficits in the context 
of aging have been linked to a diminished ability to project the self into a novel 
spatiotemporal context (Rendell et al., 2012), it might instead be that impaired self-projection 
is the central mechanism underpinning poorer episodic foresight in chronic opiate-users. The 
current study will be the first to deconstruct whether difficulties in scene construction and/or 
self-projection contribute to the episodic foresight deficits that have been identified in this 
group. 
As noted previously, a better understanding of the mechanisms responsible for 
episodic foresight difficulties in chronic opiate users has potentially important clinical 
implications. This is because, given the relapsing nature of substance dependence, treatment 
predominately focuses on the prevention of future substance use. While the episodic foresight 
difficulties identified by Mercuri et al. (2014) provide a rationale for the modification of 
treatment protocols that rely on future-oriented thinking, the extent and nature of the required 
modifications remain poorly delineated. The findings of the current study will therefore 
provide much needed direction for tailoring intervention strategies to further enhance initial 
treatment success and long-term prospects of rehabilitation.  
Method 
Participants 
This study was approved by the Australian Catholic University ethics committee and 
conformed to the ethical standards set out in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. Thirty-five 
long-term opiate-users (duration of opiate use: M = 15.15 years, SD = 9.97), aged between 27 
and 61 years were recruited. The control group consisted of 35 adults aged between 20 and 56 
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years with no reported history of alcohol or other drug dependence1. The two groups did not 
differ significantly on gender, χ2 (1, 70) = 2.20, p = 0.138, and as can be seen in Table 1, were 
closely matched on age as well as premorbid IQ as measured by the National Adult Reading 
Test (Nelson, 1982). However the opiate group had fewer years of formal education, and 
reported greater negative affect as measured by total scores on the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). The participants in the opiate-user group were 
currently enrolled in an opiate substitution program (Methadone n = 24 and Suboxone  
n = 11), with the average dose of Methadone received daily 61.60mg (SD = 38.59) and 
Suboxone, 11.14mg (SD = 9.09). Frequencies of participants reporting current substance use 
are displayed in Table 1.  
Most participants were recruited through a database of individuals who had previously 
participated in projects conducted by our research team. The remaining participants in the 
control group were recruited through the researcher’s social networks, and the opiate group 
from fliers distributed through pharmacies that dispensed opiate substitution treatments. 
Eligibility was determined by fulfilment of the same inclusion criteria used by Mercuri et al. 







1 Eight-two percent of the opiate group and 97% of the control group participants were recruited from Study 1. 
Independent samples t-tests comparing the interview performance between the re-recruited and new participants 
were conducted for each experimental group separately. Results and did not reveal any significant differences 
with all ps > .411 for the opiate group and all ps > .114 for the control group.  
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Table  1 
Background characteristics of the control and opiate-user groups 
 Control Group n = 35 a  
Opiate Group 
n = 35 b   
 M SD  M SD  t(68) d 
Proportion of Men (%) 54%  71%   
Age (in years) 36.00 10.85  40.37 9.17  1.82 0.44 
Education (in years) 14.26 2.67  12.56 2.34  2.75* 0.69 
Estimated IQ  110.19 7.41  111.81 4.88  1.08 0.26 
Mental Health         
Depression  2.83 2.77  7.50 4.34  5.35*** 1.31 
Anxiety  5.71 3.71  9.32 4.81  3.50** 0.86  
Frequency of participants engaging in current substance use 
Nicotine users (No:Yes) c 26:9  8:27    
Alcohol (No:Yes) d 5:30  17:18    
Cannabis (No:Yes) e 29:6  15:20    
Amphetamines (No:Yes) f 26:9  31:5    
Cocaine (No:Yes) g 34:1  34:1    
Benzodiazepines (No:Yes) 35:0  25:10    
Heroin (No:Yes) h 35:0  18:17    
a all ns = 35 except ‘Education’ where n = 34 
b all ns = 35 except years of ‘Education’ where n = 32 and ‘Mental health’ where n = 34 
c daily frequency of nicotine use reported for both groups 
d weekly frequency of alcohol use reported for both groups 
e 4/6 control group users reported monthly or less frequency, 16/20 of opiate group users reported ‘at least once a week’ frequency  
f  less than once a month frequency reported by both groups  
h 12/17 opiate group reported weekly use 




Episodic foresight was assessed using a modification of Addis et al. (2007) Adapted 
Autobiographical Interview (AI). The AI is a semi-structured interview used to assess 
episodic and non-episodic content in two temporal phase conditions (past and future). 
Because the focus here is episodic foresight, the current study only administered the future 
condition. To further deconstruct episodic foresight ability the interview was manipulated by 
incorporating two other imagination conditions (atemporal and narrative) developed by 
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Hassabis et al. (2007b). In the original protocol, Hassabis et al. (2007a) provided participants 
with ten verbal cues and asked them to imagine and provide descriptions of an atemporal 
event (to assess scene construction), a plausible, self-relevant future event (to additionally 
assess self-projection), as well as complete a narrative task (to provide participants with a 
story structure on which to base their description of an event). The narrative task makes the 
lowest demands on imagination and therefore provides an important means of testing whether 
any difficulties on this interview-format task simply reflect poor narrative ability. Although 
all three conditions provide some measure of scene construction related to imagination, the 
variations between the three tasks allow the disentangling of which abilities might be 
specifically compromised. For instance, the future condition is the only task that involves a 
temporal element, and therefore difficulties on this task in comparison to the other two 
suggest that episodic foresight deficits reflect particular problems specifically with the self-
projection component of this process.  
Testing sessions: Participants were informed that the task would involve separately 
imagining three different scenarios (future, atemporal, and narrative; see Table 2 for 
descriptions). Participants were instructed to imagine each scenario as vividly as possible and 
then describe it aloud in as much detail as possible, while being recorded on a digital voice 
recorder. Participants were told to give free rein to their imagination and to describe the 
experience or event using all available senses including what they could see, hear, smell, and 
feel. Specific to the future condition, it was made clear that the task was designed to assess 
how participants’ visualize and imagine, so participants were instructed not to use an existing 
memory but to create a new scene. Three minutes were allocated for each response. As soon 
as the researcher provided the task description, participants were given time to think about a 
response and once they indicated that they were ready, timing began. Before commencing, 
the researcher demonstrated the task using an example: “imagine you’re sitting on a bench in 
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a park”. The experimenter read a prepared response as if they were making it up to provide a 
model of imagining a new scenario. The experimenter then checked the participant was clear 
about what was required. 
Set prompts were provided when clarification of instructions or facilitation of further 
event description was required; for example, “Can you give me more details on X?”. If it was 
suspected that a participant was only using superficial semantic statements, they were asked, 
“What does X look/sound/ smell like?”. The protocol strictly prohibited the experimenter 
from introducing any concept, idea, detail, or entity that had not already been mentioned by 
the participant.  
Table 2 displays the three scenario cues presented to participants, one each for the 
“future”, “atemporal” and “narrative” condition. The future cue asked participants to imagine 
themselves within a particular scene in the future and describe it as if they were experiencing 
it at the present moment. The atemporal cue required imagining a scene with no temporal 
component included. The scene to be described was a commonplace setting, which minimizes 
the difficulty level and any reliance on innate creativity. The final scenario was the narrative 
condition which was similar to the atemporal condition in that it did not include any temporal 
instructions but differed by involving constructing a narrative where participants were given 
the additional instruction of moving through the scene (walking through a castle) to reach a 
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Table 2 
Details of the three scenarios in the imagination task 
Narrative scenario Imagine you are standing in the middle of the impressive high 
vaulted entrance hall of an old castle. There is a tower 
somewhere in the castle, the top of which is accessed via a 
circular winding staircase. I want you to describe to me in as 
much detail as possible your route through the castle’s many 
rooms and floors until you reach the top of the tower. Use all 
your senses including what you see, feel, and do on the way to 
the tower.  
 
Atemporal scenario  
(scene construction)  
Imagine you are sitting having a drink in a café. I want you to 
describe the experience and the surroundings in as much detail as 
possible using all your senses including what you can see, hear, 
and feel.  
 
Future scenario  
(self-projection)  
Imagine something you could be doing next summer, but just give 
me one event. I want you to describe that event and the 
surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses 
including what you can see, hear, and feel.  
 
 
Scoring: For each transcribed scenario description, details were segmented and 
categorized as either internal (episodic details specific to the central event) or external (non-
episodic details including: repetitions, semantic information, and information not specific to 
the central event). The number of internal details within each condition provided an index of 
the extent to which participants were personally experiencing the event in their imagination. 
Two independent scorers who were blind to project aims and participant group membership 
scored the transcripts. Training manuals were provided by Donna Addis, which included an 
annotated example of scoring and twenty scoring events. Inter-rater reliability between the 
two scorers and the scoring events provided in this manual was assessed on the basis of a 
two-way mixed-design Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) intraclass correlation analysis. The 
Cronbach alphas obtained with our two scorers were 0.96 for internal details and 0.92 for 
external details. The three scorers coded portions of the full dataset and each scorer was 
assigned an equal number of transcripts from both experimental groups. 
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Results 
The first step in this analysis involved assessing any potential differences in the 
amount of verbal output by the opiate and control group in order to ensure that any observed 
differences in the number of internal details generated by the two groups were not simply a 
reflection of differences in overall verbal output. An independent samples t-test found no 
significant differences (p = 0.169) between the opiate (M = 222.42, SD = 100.92) and control 
groups (M = 257.12, SD = 107.54) in the total number of details generated across all three 
interview conditions, suggesting no differences in overall amount of verbal output. Separate  
t-tests were also conducted for each imagination condition and revealed no differences in the 
total number of details generated in each of the narrative (p = 0.075), scene construction  
(p = 0.430), and self-projection (p = 0.339) conditions, between the opiate (M = 79.37, M = 
72.14, M = 74.57, respectively) and control groups (M = 97.37, M = 79.37, M = 83.15, 
respectively).  
 
The next step in the analysis involved investigating the number of details generated in 
each of the imagination tasks for the two groups. These data were analysed using a mixed 2 x 
3 x 2 ANOVA where the between-groups variable was group status (opiate user group, 
control), the within-groups variables were condition (narrative, atemporal, future) and type of 
details (internal, external), and the dependent variable was the number of details generated2. 
These data are shown in Fig. 1.  
2 Given the higher levels of negative affect reported in the opiate group, it was important to consider whether mental health issues may have 
had an impact on episodic foresight ability. No significant associations were evident between the outcome variable of internal details with 
either depression or anxiety for both the control (all ps ≥ 0.246) and opiate-user group (all ps ≥ 0.110). Consequently, no statistical control 
for these variables was required for the ANOVA analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Using multivariate statistics. Pearson, Boston. 
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Figure 1. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the interview task as a 
function of group status (control group, n = 35; opiate-user group, n = 35) and imagination 
task condition. (Error bars depict standard error of the mean)  
 
The results identified main effects of condition, F(2, 68) = 9.66, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.12, 
and detail type F(2, 67) = 167.86, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.71, power = 0.98, indicating that overall 
participants provided more details in the narrative condition (M  = 43.57, SD = 2.4), than the 
atemporal (M  = 37.88, SD = 2.3) and the future (M  = 38.44, SD = 2.02) conditions, and 
produced more internal than external details. However there was no main effect of group 
status F(1, 67) = 1.94, p = 0.169, ηp2 = 0.03, power = 0.279. The two-way interaction of 
condition and group status was also not significant, F(2, 67) = 2.10, p = 0.126, ηp2 = .03, 
power = 0.425 but  the other two way interactions were: condition and detail type, F(1, 136) 
= 19.26, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.22, power = 1.000 and group status and detail type, F(1, 68) = 
7.59, p < 0.010, ηp2 = 0.71, power = 0.775. However, superseding these main and two-way 
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F(2, 136) = 3.82, p = 0.024, ηp2 = 0.05, power = 0.686. As group status and condition were 
the two variables of interest, this was followed up by analysing the results for group and 
condition separately for internal and external details.  
Analysis of group differences for each imagination condition for each detail type 
Independent samples t-tests comparing the two groups on each interview condition 
showed that, relative to the control group, opiate users were poorer at generating internal 
details in the narrative (p = 0.042) and future (p = 0.009) conditions, but not the atemporal  
(p = 0.258) condition (see Table 3). For external details, the opiate group produced more 
external details than the control group in all three imagination conditions (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Independent samples t-tests between control and opiate-user groups, comparing detail types 
in each interview condition 
 Control Group n = 35  
Opiate Group 
n = 35   
 
 M SD  M SD  t(68) d Power 
Narrative          
Internal details 86.89 41.27  70.00 39.74  1.77* 0.50 0.42 
External details 9.35 6.83  10.45 9.12  0.57 0.16 0.08 
Atemporal          
Internal details 66.89 34.63  58.31 34.17  1.05 0.25 0.18 
External details 11.77 10.32  14.36 13.34  0.92 0.22 0.15 
Future          
Internal details 70.64 37.68  50.85 33.00  2.35* 0.56 0.65 
External details 10.87 8.20  23.33 19.82  3.45** 0.76 0.93 
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Analysis of imagination condition differences for each group for each detail type  
Paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the number of details generated 
across the interview conditions within each group. These data are reported in Table 4, 
separately for each detail type. In relation to internal details, the control group produced more 
details in the narrative condition compared to both the atemporal and future scenarios. 
However, no difference in performance was found when comparing the atemporal and future 
tasks. By contrast, the opiate group generated fewer details in the future condition when 
compared to both the narrative and atemporal tasks. However no difference was found when 
comparing the narrative and atemporal conditions (see Table 4). Analysis of external details 
revealed different patterns of performance across the conditions for each group. The control 
group’s performance was comparable across the three interview conditions. However the 
pattern for the opiate group was in contrast to that for their internals details, with more 
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Table 4 




n = 35 
 
Opiate Group 
n = 35 
 t(34) d  t(34) d 
Internal details      
Narrative vs. Atemporal  4.33*** 0.73      1.94 0.33 
Narrative vs. Future  3.70** 0.63  3.51** 0.60 
Atemporal vs. Future 0.88 0.15  2.20* 0.38 
External details      
Narrative vs. Atemporal  1.23 0.21  1.87 0.32 
Narrative vs. Future  0.93 0.16  4.08*** 0.69 
Atemporal vs. Future 0.58 0.10  3.47** 0.58 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Discussion 
In the present study chronic opiate users were found to generate significantly fewer 
episodic details when imagining a novel future scenario, which aligns with the only prior 
study to investigate episodic foresight in chronic opiate users (Mercuri et al. 2014). However 
these data extend previous work by providing key insights into the mechanisms underlying 
episodic foresight difficulties in chronic opiate users. In particular, because the two groups 
were found to differ in their capacity to imagine a personal event in the future - but not in 
their ability to construct an atemporal mental scenario - this suggests that the episodic 
foresight difficulties associated with chronic opiate use do not reflect difficulties with scene 
construction, but instead suggest difficulties with the self-projection component of this 
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process. Analysis of the pattern of results for the opiate user group across the conditions 
further supported this possibility, as fewer episodic details were generated when imagining 
the future scenario compared to constructing an atemporal scene. Furthermore, the fact that 
this group produced most non-episodic responses on the task that required the ability to 
mentally project the self into a novel future scenario is consistent with the notion that they 
found this task the most cognitively challenging (Arnold et al., 2011; D'Argembeau et al., 
2010). By contrast, there was no difference in the control group’s performance across these 
two conditions, suggesting that they did not find the task requiring the construction of a future 
scene with its additional requirement for self-projection any more challenging than 
constructing an atemporal scene.  
Despite the fewer episodic details generated in the narrative condition by the opiate 
group relative to the control participants, both groups performed better in the narrative 
condition compared to when constructing a future scenario. As a result, deficits in the 
capacity for mental construction of novel future experience do not appear to be secondary to 
impoverished narrative ability. The poorer capacity for narrative construction may be 
explained by variables more closely linked to linguistic ability, and therefore should be 
explored further.  
Taken together, these data therefore provide novel evidence that the episodic foresight 
difficulties associated with chronic opiate use are independent of scene construction and 
narrative ability. Instead, the most parsimonious explanation is that difficulties adopting 
alternative perspectives related to the self in a future temporal context contribute to reduced 
episodic foresight in this group. Interestingly, reduced capacity for self-projection was also 
implicated in the decline in episodic foresight amongst older adults identified by Rendell et 
al. (2012) raising the possibility that there may be some overlap in areas of brain impairment, 
possibly in the MTL, between these two groups. 
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Overall, these findings are important, not only theoretically, but also in terms of their 
potential practical implications for improving independent living. Indeed, D'Argembeau et al. 
(2011) highlighted the prominent role that thinking about the future plays in everyday life, 
reporting that in healthy adults the frequency of future-oriented thoughts outweighs those 
about the past, with a future thought occurring every 16 minutes. In fact, this study showed 
that individuals tend to simulate hypothetical future outcomes when engaging in processes 
such as planning, decision-making, problem solving, and other goal-related cognitions 
essential for successful daily functioning. It therefore seems likely that any problems with 
episodic foresight may contribute to the functional difficulties associated with chronic opiate 
use. Consequently, in order to better support functional capacity in this group, it may be 
valuable to modify interventions in rehabilitation settings so that clients are taught strategies 
to evaluate possible courses of action that are less reliant on the need to personally imagine 
the self-experiencing the future. In this way, any potential impact of this cognitive limitation 
may be minimized.  
This is a possibility that warrants serious further empirical study, particularly given 
the very high rate of relapse often seen in opiate users (McLellan et al., 2000). Indeed, one 
recent study reported a relapse rate of 91% in this cohort within one year of inpatient 
treatment (Smyth et al., 2010). Treatment of substance dependence therefore relies heavily on 
relapse prevention, which often involves a focus on developing skills to confidently reject 
future drug offers, formulation of methods for managing exposure to relapse triggers, and 
cost-benefit analysis of changing current drug-related behaviors. Problems engaging in 
episodic foresight may help explain why these individuals experience difficulties achieving 
and maintaining abstinence. More specifically, our results suggest that while substance 
dependent individuals may be able to imagine and construct a mental image of a substance 
free existence in the present moment, they have difficulty in mentally projecting this scenario 
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into a future time period. Such findings point to the potential value of constructing short-term 
treatment objectives, rather than planning goals that are in the client’s distant future. Relapse 
prevention strategies may therefore have better success if they focus on the client’s current 
needs and assist the client in fulfilling immediate treatment related goals such as 
remembering to collect pharmacotherapy, presenting to mandatory medical appointments in 
order to refill prescriptions, and attending therapy.  
In conclusion, the present study identifies for the first time one of the underlying 
mechanisms that contributes to the episodic foresight difficulties seen in chronic opiate users. 
Specifically, these data provide evidence for a specific problem implementing the self-
projection component of this process. These data provide a platform for future studies that 
use neuroimaging procedures to explore the neural underpinnings of these deficits. The 
results also have potentially important implications for refinement of rehabilitation programs, 
providing guidance for how treatment protocols might be tailored to more strongly align with 
the cognitive abilities of chronic opiate users (as well as potentially other substance abuse 
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CHAPTER 8: Introduction to Article 3 
8.1 Objective 
Although chronic opiate use is associated with greater deleterious outcomes, cannabis 
continues to be the most widely used substance worldwide and there is an increasing demand 
for cannabis-related treatment (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014).  Cannabis 
is derived from the Cannabis Satvia plant and its psychoactive effects are attributed to the 
cannabinoid known as delta-tetrahydrocanabidinol (THC). THC binds to type – 1 
cannabinoid (CB1) receptors found in a number of prefrontal and temporal brain structures 
(Ameri, 1999; Pertwee, 2008). Not surprisingly a number of studies have identified cannabis-
related declines in executive processing, learning, and memory (Abdullaev et al., 2010; Bolla 
et al., 2005; Curran et al., 2002; Solowij et al., 2002).   
Given these identified impairments the question of interest in Study 3 was whether 
episodic foresight deficits might be found in other, arguably less harmful, drugs such as 
cannabis. Thus the primary aim of this third study was to directly assess episodic foresight 
ability in the context of regular cannabis use. The secondary was to examine whether episodic 
memory and executive control would contribute to episodic foresight within the context of 
regular cannabis use.  
8.2 Method 
This third study administered the same protocol used in Study 1. Episodic foresight 
was assessed using the Adapted Autobiographical Interview. Three measures of executive 
functioning were also administered to 25 regular cannabis users and 45 demographically 
matched substance naïve controls. Both groups were recruited through the Australian 
Catholic University and the researcher’s social network.  
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8.3 Results 
The results did not reveal cannabis-related deficits in episodic foresight, episodic 
memory, or executive control. However significant relationships between episodic foresight 
and episodic memory, and between episodic foresight and executive functioning were 
observed in both experimental groups, which provided some support for the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis.  
8.4 Conclusions 
This study is the first to directly assess episodic foresight ability in the context of 
cannabis use. The findings provide support for the involvement of memory and executive 
processes in the capacity for episodic foresight, but did not identify cannabis-related deficits. 
The results therefore suggest that episodic foresight ability is spared in this cannabis-using 
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Episodic foresight in regular cannabis users 
 
Current status: Submitted for review to the Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology on 4th January, 2015 
 
Appendix B: Participant Recruitment and Informed Consent 
Appendix C: Background Measures 
Appendix D: Adapted Autobiographical Interview Script 
Appendix H – 3: Confirmation of Submission for Article 3 
 
Tables 
Table 1 Participant characteristics 
Figures 
Figure 1. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
group status (substance naive control group, n = 45; cannabis user group, n = 25) and 
temporal direction. (Error bars depict standard error of the mean)  
 
Figure 2. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
group status (substance naive control group, n = 45; cannabis user group, n = 25) (Error 
bars depict standard error of the mean)  
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Figure 3. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
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Abstract 
There is considerable literature showing that cannabis use is associated with a range of 
neurocognitive deficits, including deficits in executive control and episodic memory. 
However, no study to date has assessed whether these neurocognitive difficulties extend to 
the ability to mentally time travel into one’s personal future.  This is a surprising omission 
given that executive control and episodic memory are considered to be critical to engage 
episodic foresight. Therefore, in the present study we assessed how episodic foresight is 
affected in the context of regular cannabis use, and examined the degree to which 
performance on a measure of episodic foresight is correlated with performance on measures 
of episodic memory and executive control. Twenty-five regular cannabis users and 45 
substance naive controls were assessed using three measures of executive function and an 
adapted version of the Autobiographical Interview as an index of episodic foresight and 
episodic memory. The results provide no evidence of cannabis-related impairment in episodic 
foresight, episodic memory, or executive functioning. However it is possible that this lack of 
episodic foresight deficit may be attributable to factors related to the nature of the cannabis 
use and/or to compensatory cognitive mechanisms. The present study indicates that cannabis 
use may not always disrupt cognitive function, and shows for the first time that this extends 
to the capacity for episodic foresight. 
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Introduction 
The primary ingredient responsible for the psychoactive effects of cannabis is  
∆9 – tetrahydrocannabinol (THC; Pertwee, 2008). THC binds to Type 1 cannabinoid (CB1) 
receptors, high densities of which are found in frontal and temporal brain regions (Ameri, 
1999; Glass, Dragunow, & Faull, 1997; Mechoulam & Parker, 2013; Quickfall & Crockford, 
2006). THC appears to contribute to many of the cognitive effects of cannabis use, including 
reduced capacity for executive control, learning, and memory (Abdullaev, Posner, Nunnally, 
& Dishion, 2010; Bolla, Elderth, Matochik, & Cadet, 2005; Curran, Brignell, Fletcher, 
Middleton, & Henry, 2002; Ilan, Smith, & Gevins, 2004; Solowij et al., 2002).  
Episodic foresight is a critically important cognitive ability which refers to the 
capacity to mentally travel forward in time. Importantly, evidence now indicates that the 
ability to apply episodic foresight relies on a range of cognitive skills, including many of 
those affected by cannabis use, such as episodic memory and executive control (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). More specifically, according to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, 
past episodic memories are required to provide the building blocks for the mental 
construction of hypothetical future events, and executive processes assist in the flexible 
recombination of these memories into a new time period to avoid simply recasting the past 
memories (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Henry, 2013). It is therefore a surprising 
omission in this literature that no study to date has directly assessed whether the capacity for 
episodic foresight is disrupted in the context of cannabis use.   
In addition to theoretical value, such an assessment has potentially important practical 
implications. This is because episodic foresight has been consistently linked to independent 
living and a wide variety of functional behaviors (Suddendorf & Henry, 2013). Given that 
regular cannabis use is associated with a number of psychosocial deficits (see Hall, 2014 for 
review), it is important to clarify whether a breakdown in episodic foresight potentially 
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contributes to these difficulties. Consistent with such a possibility, deficits in episodic 
foresight have been consistently identified in other clinical groups that present with reduced 
functional capacity  (de Vito et al., 2012; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vaan, & Maguire, 2007; Irish, 
Addington, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Race, Keane, & 
Verfaellie, 2011; Raffard, D'Argembeau, Bayyard, Boulenger, & van der Linden, 2010; 
Terrett et al., 2013), including chronic opiate users (Mercuri et al., 2014). 
 Amongst this research, Mercuri et al.’s (2014) study with opiate users is the only one 
to date to investigate episodic foresight in the context of substance misuse.  Consequently, the 
present study aimed to address an important gap in the literature and clarify for the first time 
whether regular use of cannabis also disrupts capacity for episodic foresight. Because of 
evidence showing that this drug particularly affects a number of the neural regions known to 
be implicated in episodic foresight, and disrupts many of the cognitive operations believed to 
be involved in this capacity such as executive control and memory, we anticipated that 
regular cannabis use would be associated with difficulties applying episodic foresight.  Our 
secondary question was to clarify the degree to which episodic foresight performance in 
regular users of cannabis is correlated with performance on measures of episodic memory and 
executive control.  
Method 
Participants 
This study was approved by the Australian Catholic University ethics committee and 
conformed to the ethical standards set out in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. Twenty-five 
regular cannabis users aged 18 to 30 years were recruited, as well as 45 controls aged 18 to 
29 years with no history of illicit drug use. All participants were recruited using a range of 
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community advertisements, and social networking3. Although 33 cannabis users initially 
responded, eight participants were excluded due to relatively infrequent use or an absence of 
current cannabis use. Exclusion criteria for both groups included: a previous or current 
neurological condition; a psychiatric disorder; a history of heavy alcohol use (defined as 28 
standard drinks per week for men and 14 for women) (Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council, 2001); or a previous acquired brain injury. Participants were 
instructed to refrain from use of alcohol or illicit drugs in the 24 hours prior to testing. 
Participants were sent a reminder text message at least 24 hours prior to their testing time and 
abstinence was confirmed via self report on the day of testing. Participants were also 
excluded if English was not their first language. All participants were reimbursed up to 
AU$30 (~USD$30) for their time. 
The cannabis sample consisted of relatively novice, but regular users of the drug. 
Seventy-two percent of the total cannabis sample reported “at least fortnightly” frequency of 
use and the remaining reported “at least monthly”. Over two thirds (68%) described dosage of 
use per sitting as “one to three joints” with the remaining participants reporting “three or 
more joints”. Forty-four percent of the sample categorized their duration of use as “between 
six and twelve months”, 36% reported “1 – 5 years” of use, and the remaining 20% reported 
“at least 5 years” of cannabis use. Although duration of use (in years) was reported 
categorically, age of onset was approximated by subtracting the lower bound of the duration 
category from the participant’s age. The average age of onset was relatively high (M =19.34 
years, SD = 2.35). Frequencies of current alcohol and other drug use for the cannabis group 
are displayed in Table 1. 
 
3  This sample did not include any participants from the previous studies conducted by the researchers 
investigating episodic foresight in long-term opiate use. 
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Table 1 








n = 25 
  
Proportion of Men (%) 15%  36%   
 M ± SD  M ± SD  t(68) d 
Age (in years) 20.91 ± 2.81   21.04 ± 3.19  0.17 0.04 
Education (in years) 15.30 ± 14.41  14.32 ± 0.97  2.60** 0.63 
Estimated IQ  110.08 ± 4.80  111.07 ± 4.82   0.82 0.20 
Psychopathology       
Depression a 2.20 ± 2.13  4.00 ± 3.93  2.10* 0.51 
Anxiety a 6.61 ± 2.58  6.28 ± 4.54  0.33 0.80 
Executive Functions       
Verbal Fluency  57.58 ± 17.04  63.56 ± 14.20  1.57 0.38 
Cognitive Flexibility 28.32 ± 14.75  32.14 ± 17.13  0.94 0.23 
Inhibition 6.29 ± 0.83  6.40 ± 0.54  0.25 0.06 
 n(No: Yes)  n(No: Yes)    
Alcohol b users (No:Yes) 0:45  0:25    
Amphetamine users 
(No:Yes) -  10:15 
c    
Cocaine users (No:Yes) -  18:7 c    
Heroin users (No:Yes)   25:0     
Hallucinogen users 
(No:Yes) -  20:5 
c    
Benzodiazepine users 
(No:Yes) -  22:3
 c    
d = Cohen’s d index of effect size. Cohen (1999) defines effect sizes of 0.2 as small, 0.5 as medium, and 
0.8 as large. 
a df adjusted for unequal variances 
b weekly frequency of use for both groups 
c monthly or less frequency of use 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As shown in Table 1, although the groups differed on years of formal education, they 
were matched on age and premorbid intelligence as measured by the National Adult Reading 
Test (Nelson, 1982), and did not significantly differ in gender, χ2 (1, 70) = 3.81, p =.051. The 
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cannabis group did however report higher levels of depressive symptoms, but not anxiety, as 
measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).   
Materials  
Executive control 
Three measures which are particularly sensitive to mental flexibility, inhibitory 
control, and cognitive initiation were used as indices of executive control. Mental flexibility 
was assessed using the Trail Making Test (TMT), the Hayling Sentence Completion Test was 
used to assess inhibitory control (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), and a verbal fluency (both 
phonemic and semantic probes) task was administered to assess cognitive initiation (Strauss, 
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). For more details of the measures used, please see Mercuri et al. 
(2014).  
Episodic foresight and episodic memory 
Episodic foresight and episodic memory were assessed using the Addis, Wong, and 
Schacter (2008) adaptation of the Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and Moscovitch (2002) 
Autobiographical Interview (AI). The AI is a semi-structured interview which provides an 
index of both episodic foresight and episodic memory by assessing episodic and non-episodic 
content in two temporal phase conditions (past and future). Participants are instructed to 
describe a personally experienced event from their past or a novel future event in response to 
a cue word. Six cue words used were chosen to prompt event descriptions. They were chosen 
from the “Affective Norms for English Words List” (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999), and 
were the same as those used in the Mercuri et al. (2014) study. A maximum of three minutes 
was allocated for each description. Interview transcripts were independently scored by two 
trained scorers4, and scoring was based on the type of details generated by the participants. 
4 Inter rater reliability between the three scorers was assessed on the basis of a two-way mixed-design Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
intraclass correlation analysis. The Cronbach alphas obtained with our three scorers was 0.90 for internal and 0.87 for external details. 
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Details were segmented and categorized as either internal (episodic details specific to the 
central event) or external (non-episodic details including: repetitions, semantic information, 
and information not specific to the central event). The number of internal details generated 
for future events is the primary measure of episodic future thinking and the number of 
internal details for past events indexes episodic memory. Further details relating to the 
administration and scoring of the AI can be found in Mercuri et al. (2014). 
Procedure 
All participants provided informed consent and were all tested individually in one 
session of approximately three hours duration, with breaks provided as needed. 
Administration of cognitive assessments was counterbalanced.  
Data Analysis 
All statistical tests were 2-tailed. An alpha level of p < 0.05 was considered significant, and 
effect sizes were estimated using partial eta squared (η2p). Data were screened for missing 
values and outliers. Little’s MCAR test indicated that data was missing completely at 
random, χ2 (1) =7.84, p = 0.797, therefore expectation maximization was used to replace 
missing values. Significant positive skewness was rectified using logarithmic 
transformations. 
Results 
Background measures of cognitive functioning 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for the TMT, Hayling, and verbal fluency tests 
are reported in Table 1. It can be seen that there were no group differences on any of the 
executive function measures.   
 
 
EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE   123 
Autobiographical Interview (AI) 
The first step in this analysis involved assessing any potential differences in the 
amount of verbal output by the cannabis and control group in order to ensure that any 
observed differences in the number of internal details generated by the two groups were not 
simply a reflection of differences in overall verbal output. An independent samples t-test 
found no significant differences (p = .450) between the cannabis (M = 607.80, SD = 137.58) 
and control groups (M = 576.19, SD = 210.14) in the total number of details generated across 
all three interview conditions, suggesting no overall differences in verbal output. 
The next step in the analysis involved investigating the number of details generated 
for the past and future event descriptions for the two groups. These data were analyzed using 
a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA where the between group variable was group status (cannabis user 
group, control), and the within group variables were temporal direction (past, future) and 
detail type (internal, external). These data are shown in Figure 1.  
The independent variable of primary interest, group status, was not a main effect, F 
(1, 68) = 0.46, p = .501, ηp2 = 0.007, power = 0.050 but did interact with detail type, F (1, 68) 
= 5.67, p = .020, ηp2 = 0.08, power = 0.349.  Group status did not interact with temporal 
direction, F (1, 68) = 0.06, p = .804, ηp2 < 0.01, power = 0.191 and three way interaction was 
not significant, F (1, 68) = 0.37, p = .544, ηp2 < 0.01, power = 0.200.  The other two 
independent variables were main effects: temporal direction, F(1, 68) = 101.93, p < .001, ηp2 
= 0.60, power = 1.000, and detail type , F (1, 68) = 172.94, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.73, power = 
1.000.  These main effects were trumped by the interaction of group status and detail type and 
the interaction of temporal direction and detail type, F(1, 68) = 59.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.47, 
power = 1.000. 
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Figure 1. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
group status (substance naive control group, n = 45; cannabis user group, n = 25) and 
temporal direction. (Error bars depict standard error of the mean)  
 
For the interaction between detail type and group status, tests of simple effects 
revealed the group differences were not significant for both internal details, F (1, 68) = 2.67, 
p = .107, ηp2 = 0.038, power = 0.421; and external details, F (1, 68) = 0.20, p = .657, ηp2 = 
0.003, power = 0.071. The interaction between detail type and group status is shown in Figure 
2, and tests of simple effects revealed that there were less external than internal details 
generated for both cannabis, F (1, 68) = 93.82, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.580, power = 1.000 and 
substance naive control group F (1, 68) = 81.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.544, power = 1.000.  
However, while differences were significant for both groups, the difference is larger for the 
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There is no indication of any differences between the groups in the number of details 
generated.   
 
Figure 2. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
group status (substance naive control group, n = 45; cannabis user group, n = 25) (Error 
bars depict standard error of the mean)  
 
The second significant interaction between temporal direction and detail type is 
shown in Figure 3, and tests of simple effects revealed that there were significantly more 
internal details generated in the past condition than the future condition, F(1, 68) = 128.82, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.65, but the number of external details generated in past and future condition 
did not differ significantly, F(1, 68) = 128.82, p = 0.134, ηp2 = 0.032 . Further analyses 
revealed that there were more internal than external details generated for both past condition 
F (1, 68) = 218.44 , p < .001 , ηp2 = 0.760, and future condition, F (1, 68) = 30.76 , p < .001 , 
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Figure 3. Mean number of internal and external details generated on the AI as a function of 
temporal direction (past, future) (Error bars depict standard error of the mean)  
 
In summary, the key finding was that the groups did not differ in the number of 
internal or external details generated.  Group status was not a main effect and did not interact 
with other variables except for the two way interaction of group status and detail type. 
However further analysis of this interaction showed there was not a significant difference 
between the groups in the number of internal or external details generated. There was one 
other significant interaction, between temporal direction and detail type.   Analyses revealed 
that all participants generated more internal details for past than future conditions, while the 
number of external details did not differ between past and future conditions. Finally, all 
participants generated more internal than external details for both past and future conditions. 
Correlations 
Finally, in order to investigate cognitive correlates of episodic foresight, correlation 
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memory (past internal details) and the three measures of executive functioning for the two 
groups separately. Episodic foresight and episodic memory were strongly correlated for the 
control group (r = .81) and moderately correlated for the cannabis group (r = .47). The only 
executive function measure to correlate with episodic foresight in both groups was verbal 
fluency. However the correlation was large in magnitude for the cannabis group (r = .56), but 
only moderate sized for the control group (r = .31). No other correlations attained 
significance in either group.  
Discussion 
These data provide the first direct assessment of how the critical capacity for episodic 
foresight is affected by regular cannabis use. Contrary to predictions, the results showed that 
cannabis users generated a comparable number of episodic details when imagining novel 
future scenarios relative to substance naive controls. These results therefore indicate that 
cannabis use may not adversely affect capacity for episodic foresight. However, the results 
also provide no evidence of any impairment in episodic memory (as indexed by the number 
of past internal details on the AI), or executive functioning, which is not consistent with some 
previous studies which have identified deficits in these abilities (Curran et al., 2002; Ilan et 
al., 2004). These data indicate that cannabis, at least when used at the level engaged in by the 
current sample, may not have any influence on a broad range of cognitive functions, 
including episodic foresight. These results can therefore be regarded as positive news in light 
of the relatively large number of community dwelling adults (180 million users globally) that 
report using cannabis (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). 
However, there are a number of important caveats and additional considerations that 
are likely to be important in interpreting these data. First, although the sample consisted of 
regular cannabis users, the average age that regular use was reported to commence was 
relatively high (19.34 years). Greater neurocognitive difficulties have been consistently 
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associated with early age of onset of cannabis use, usually in adolescence (see Lisdahl, 
Wright, Medina-Kirchner, Maple, & Scollenbarger, 2014 for review). It is therefore possible 
that there has been less disruption to neurodevelopment in the current cannabis sample than 
might be found in a sample whose cannabis use commenced earlier in adolescence (Gonzalez 
& Swanson, 2012).  
Second, although this study did not collect data relating to the type of cannabis used 
by participants, in Australia the prevalence of high THC cannabis strains, such as synthetic 
products commonly sold as “skunk” or “kronic”, is very low (1.2% lifetime prevalence) 
compared to more natural varieties (38% lifetime prevalence) (Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, 2014). While high THC cannabis strains have been linked to greater 
neurocognitive impairment, there is now a growing literature showing that cannabis 
containing high levels of cannabidiol (CBD), can mitigate the amnestic, psychosis-like and 
attentional bias effects of THC (Morgan et al, 2010a, b). Consequently, the lack of episodic 
foresight difficulties (and other cognitive difficulties) observed in this cannabis using sample 
could be due to the type of cannabis consumed being high in CBD. 
However, a third possible explanation for the absence of any group differences may 
relate to the use of compensatory mechanisms. It is not uncommon to observe an absence of 
compromised cognitive performance in the presence of alterations in neurological functioning 
within the context of cannabis use (Chang, Yakupov, Cloak, & Ernst, 2006; Elderth, 
Matochik, Cadet, & Bolla, 2004; Nestor, Hester, & Garavan, 2010; Schweinsburg, 
Schweinsburg, Nagel, Eyler, & Tapert, 2010). It has been proposed that intact performance 
on some cognitive paradigms in this cohort may be due to the recruitment of extra brain 
regions to compensate for atrophy within required areas (Chang et al., 2006; Elderth et al., 
2004; Nestor et al., 2010; Schweinsburg et al., 2010). The pattern of correlations identified in 
this study would appear to be at least broadly consistent with such a possibility. Specifically, 
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the weaker correlation between episodic foresight and episodic memory found for the 
cannabis user group compared to the control group may indicate that the cannabis group were 
less able to utilize episodic memory when constructing future scenarios. This have led them 
in turn to recruit more assistance from other cognitive processes to compensate for this 
leading to no difference in measured performance between the two groups. Such a possibility 
however awaits further empirical investigation.  
Lastly, despite the lack of interaction between substance-use status and the type of 
event details generated from the interview, there appears to be a (albeit weak) trend in that 
there is a group difference in internal details but no difference in the generation of external 
details. Given the relatively light substance use reported by the cannabis-using participants, it 
is possible that the measures employed to assess episodic foresight are not sensitive enough to 
identify subtle deficits. Future investigations could aim towards assessing episodic foresight 
in samples of heavier or more frequent users. Alternatively (or additionally), a qualitative 
investigation of the type of details being generated by this substance-using group may assist 
in detecting subtle differences in episodic foresight ability within the context of cannabis-use.  
Taken together, the present study indicates that cannabis use may not always disrupt 
cognitive function, and shows for the first time that this extends to the capacity for episodic 
foresight. In light of the current study involving a possibly unique group of cannabis users 
that were low level, late onset and used for relatively short period, future research is now 
needed to cross-validate these findings in a larger clinical cohort. In particular, it seems 
important to clarify how the capacity for episodic foresight might be affected across different 
levels of cannabis use, and the degree to which performance varies as a function of initial age 
of cannabis use.  These are important questions in light of the widespread use of cannabis, 
and well-documented psychosocial consequences associated with its use. Specifically, a 
better understanding of when and why cognitive functioning is likely to be impacted in this 
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CHAPTER 10: Discussion 
10.1 Introduction and chapter overview 
The three studies presented in this research project were designed to examine episodic 
foresight ability in two different substance-using groups. The overall objectives across the 
three studies were: 
Study 1: 
• To investigate episodic foresight ability in a group of long term opiate users 
• To determine whether memory and executive functions contribute to episodic 
foresight ability in the context of chronic, illicit substance use 
Study 2: 
• To explore whether the identified episodic foresight deficit obtained in Study 1 
may be attributable to compromised scene construction, self-projection, and/or 
narrative ability 
Study 3: 
• To investigate whether episodic foresight ability would also be impaired in a 
group of regular cannabis users 
• To determine whether memory and executive function contribute to episodic 
foresight ability in the context of regular cannabis use  
The findings from all three studies represent the first assessment of episodic foresight 
within the context of psychoactive substance use. The data demonstrate differences in 
episodic foresight ability across different substance-using groups, highlighting the variable 
impact of psychoactive drugs on human cognition. This chapter begins with summaries and a 
combined discussion of the first two studies focusing on opiate users, followed by a summary 
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and discussion of the third study. The discussions focus on the theoretical and clinical 
implications of these results.  Limitations and strengths of the overall project are presented 
before a concluding paragraph summarising the overall project.  
10.2 Study 1 summary of results  
This study was conducted to address a noticeable gap in the literature regarding an 
absence of investigations examining episodic foresight ability in any substance-using group. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis formulated for this initial study, the opiate user group 
demonstrated compromised episodic foresight ability in comparison to a healthy control 
group. When instructed to imagine and subsequently describe themselves in a novel future 
scenario, the opiate group experienced significant difficulty generating details that were 
specific to their own personal experience. Their inability was further reinforced by generation 
of a larger number of off-topic details such as semantic information or repetitions of events 
they had already previously-experienced. The findings of Study 1 only partially supported the 
second hypothesis that predicted relationships between episodic foresight and episodic 
memory, and executive control. Despite no difference in episodic memory ability between the 
two groups, a significant relationship between episodic memory and episodic foresight was 
found for both opiate users and controls, supporting the notion that these two faculties rely on 
similar neural substrates.  Contrary to predictions, executive control did not differ between 
the two groups, nor did it correlate with episodic foresight in either group.  
10.3 Study 2 summary of results  
Study 2 was conducted to better understand the mechanisms underlying the deficit in 
episodic foresight amongst opiate users identified in Study 1. More specifically, this follow 
up investigation aimed to address whether this deficit reflected compromised scene 
construction, self-projection, or narrative ability. As anticipated the opiate user group 
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performed less well than the control group when asked to imagine and describe a personally 
relevant future scenario, confirming a deficit in episodic foresight. However this study 
provided further insight into the potential mechanisms underlying this deficit. Relative to the 
control group the opiate user group generated fewer personally relevant details when 
instructed to provide a narrative based on a predefined story structure as well as when 
instructed to imagine experiencing an event in their personal future. This initial result 
suggested that opiate-related episodic foresight deficits are a function of both narrative ability 
and self-projection. However on further inspection of within group performance, both the 
control and opiate groups performed better in the narrative task relative to the self-projection 
task. Given that the scenario cue used in the narrative condition provided participants with a 
detailed story structure, there was a lesser demand for independent scene construction. The 
opiate user group however performed much worse on the task requiring self-projection 
relative to their narrative performance. Consequently, episodic foresight deficits in chronic 
opiate users may be explained by an inability to projection the self into a novel future which 
is not secondary to narrative ability. 
10.4 Contributions and implications of studies 1 and 2  
The findings from Study 1 provide the first direct evidence that episodic foresight is 
impaired within the context of chronic opiate use, and indicate that this deficit is not 
secondary to impairments in memory or executive control. Furthermore, studies 1 and 2 
provide support for the constructive simulation hypothesis that postulates that memories 
(episodic) are the basic materials used for future event construction. Study 2 in particular 
shows that other cognitive processes such as self-projection are recruited in order to construct 
and pre-experience novel future events. The findings of these first two studies highlight the 
complex nature of episodic foresight, which is considered to be more cognitively demanding 
than episodic memory. Also, this behavioural evidence from the first two studies is consistent 
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with the suggestion that compromised foresight ability may be a reflection of abnormalities in 
areas of the brain known to be functionally and structurally altered within the context of 
chronic opiate use and that are established as being associated with episodic foresight (such 
as the MTL).  
While theoretically important, the data from the first and second studies of this project 
also have significant implications for the treatment of long-standing substance dependence. 
Poor treatment compliance and high relapse rates are particularly common among long-term 
opiate users attempting to achieve abstinence from their addiction (Smyth, Barry, Keenan, & 
Ducray, 2010). Therefore the identification of an episodic foresight deficit within the context 
of chronic opiate use can be useful in informing the modification of treatment protocols used 
alongside front line pharmacotherapies. For example, Motivational Interviewing (MI) 
strategies often used in the treatment of addiction, aim to address ambivalence towards 
change by promoting intrinsic motivation towards behaviour modification (Arkowitz & 
Miller, 2008). A commonly used tool in MI is decisional balancing which focuses on an 
individual’s ambivalence towards behaviour change (Miller & Rollnick, 2009). This process 
requires generating positive and negative consequences that would occur as a result of 
changing behaviour in order to encourage intrinsic motivation to initiate the change process 
(Miller & Rollnick, 2009). In the context of substance dependence this could involve 
considering possible outcomes associated with the cessation of compulsive drug use. The 
concept of a drug free existence would be a very foreign concept for many opiate users, 
particularly chronic opiate users given that opiate use tends to be initiated after an extensive 
period of other substance use (Fernández-Serrano et al., 2011). Given the breakdown in 
episodic foresight, the generation of positive outcomes associated with drug-free living may 
be particularly difficult for a long term user to personally imagine and pre-experience, 
therefore hindering the promotion of intrinsic motivation towards changing problem drug-
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using behaviour. This suggests some alterations may need to be made to this aspect of 
treatment to accommodate episodic foresight deficits in order to maximise successful 
outcomes.  
However, even for those who seek treatment already motivated to change their 
problem behaviour (Arkowitz & Miller, 2008) episodic foresight deficits may also hinder 
treatment success. This is because in these cases, interventions become more goal-directed. 
Such interventions include developing a plan for change. This involves deciding on what 
exactly needs to change in a client’s life and generating more adaptive behavioural 
contingencies that promote the achievement of these changes. In order to encourage 
motivation towards a modified lifestyle, the client would be encouraged to envision a future 
that includes the changes they would like to achieve (Arkowitz & Miller, 2008). With a 
reduced capacity for episodic foresight, treatment success again is likely to be reduced.  
In studies 1 and 2 participants showered compromised episodic foresight when 
instructed to imagine future event three years and one year into the future, respectively. These 
findings suggest that relapse prevention protocols that require clients to picture their future if 
they made desired changes should not focus on assisting clients to set goals well ahead in the 
future, but rather should emphasise short term treatment objectives. Better treatment 
compliance and prognosis may result if treatment is focused more on fulfilling immediate 
treatment related goals, which are in line with the client’s current needs, such as simply 
remembering therapy appointments. Constructing long-term abstinence goals may be too 
difficult for this clinical group and may be hard for them to imagine themselves realistically 
achieving. Overall, the findings of the first two studies of this research project do not suggest 
a complete revolution of current treatment methods, but rather indicate that modification may 
be beneficial such that there is less demand for future-oriented thinking during the treatment 
of long-term opiate use.  
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10.5 Study 3 summary of results  
Given the existing evidence for cannabis-related impairments in a range of cognitions 
such as learning, memory, and executive processing (Abdullaev et al., 2010; Bolla et al., 
2005; Curran et al., 2002; Solowij et al., 2002), the primary goal of Study 3 was to explore 
whether episodic foresight deficits would also be observed in the context of regular cannabis 
use. Similar to Study 1 the secondary objective was to explore the relationships between 
episodic foresight and episodic memory, and executive control. To address these questions 
this study administered the same neurocognitive battery employed in Study 1. In contrast to 
Study 1, the findings of this third study did not find cannabis-related impairments in episodic 
foresight, with the cannabis group’s ability to generate personally relevant details of novel 
future events comparable to the substance naïve control group. There was also no cannabis-
related memory impairment observed in this third study. However the findings did support 
the notion that episodic memory contributes to the capacity to construct and pre-experience 
novel future experiences, as similar to Study 1, a relationship was observed between episodic 
foresight and episodic memory in both experimental groups. A relationship between episodic 
foresight and executive functioning (as indexed by performance on a measure of verbal 
fluency) was also identified in both groups suggesting a role for executive control in episodic 
foresight, which had not been apparent for either group in Study 1. 
10.6 Contributions and implications of study 3 
These data add to the currently inconsistent literature relating to cannabis-related 
cognitive functioning. As previously noted there is ongoing debate over the neurotoxicity of 
cannabis in humans and the literature provides strong evidence both for (Abdullaev et al., 
2010; Bolla et al., 2005; Curran et al., 2002; Morgan, Schafer, et al., 2010; Solowij et al., 
2002) and against (Chang et al., 2006; Elderth et al., 2004; Nestor et al., 2010; Schweinsburg 
et al., 2010) potentially damaging neurocognitive outcomes. The findings of Study 3 suggest 
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that cognitive functioning, at least in terms of episodic foresight ability, is spared in the 
context of cannabis use. However there are a number of explanations that may account for the 
absence of group differences in episodic foresight that should be considered before this 
conclusion can be confidently made.  
First, the cannabis-using group recruited for Study 3 reported a relatively later age of 
cannabis initiation (over 18 years old). This sample characteristic is particularly notable 
because earlier introduction to cannabis use, particularly during early adolescence, is 
associated with greater cannabis-related cognitive impairments (Gonzalez & Swanson, 2012; 
Hall, 2014; Lisdahl, Wright, Medina-Kirchner, Maple, & Scollenbarger, 2014). Given the 
later age of onset reported in this cannabis-using sample it is possible that neurological 
development followed the typical trajectory prior to initiation of use, therefore allowing for 
intact cognitive processing.   
Second, the strain of cannabis used can have a significant impact on cognitive 
outcomes with recent studies demonstrating greater cognitive impairment as a function of its 
pharmacological makeup (Morgan, Freeman, Schafer, & Curran, 2010; Morgan, Schafer, et 
al., 2010). This pharmacological make up can vary significantly depending on the region the 
cannabis is grown in and methods of growth. It should therefore be considered that the lack of 
group differences in Study 3 might to some extent be a function of the strain of cannabis used 
by the participants.  
However, another arguably stronger argument for the lack of episodic foresight 
impairment observed within the context of cannabis use may relate to the use of 
compensatory mechanisms. Despite neuroimaging studies observing cannabis-related 
alterations in neurological functioning, the performance of cannabis-using individuals across 
various cognitive paradigms have been shown to be comparable to healthy control 
participants (Chang et al., 2006; Elderth et al., 2004; Nestor et al., 2010; Schweinsburg et al., 
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2010). For example, Chang et al. (2006) observed lower activation in prefrontal, medial, and 
parietal brain regions, but increase activity within the cerebellum of active cannabis users, 
relative to healthy controls. However behavioural performance on a battery of 
neuropsychological assessments for functions including memory, attention, and executive 
functioning, was comparable between the cannabis and control groups. Similarly, a study by 
Schweinsburg et al. (2010) showed that when completing a task of spatial working memory, 
adolescent cannabis users had greater brain activity in prefrontal regions and the anterior 
insula than controls, but performance on the spatial working memory task did not differ 
between the two groups. Studies such as these proposed that the lack of differences in 
cognitive abilities in the presence of abnormal neural functioning may be the result of non-
related brain regions being recruited to compensate for atrophy in the associated areas 
required for intact processing (Chang et al., 2006; Elderth et al., 2004; Nestor et al., 2010; 
Schweinsburg et al., 2010). This is therefore one other possible explanation of the lack of 
episodic foresight deficit in cannabis users in the current research project.  
Despite no cannabis-related deficit in episodic foresight identified in Study 3, these 
data provide a platform for further investigation of the circumstances in which cannabis use 
might influence episodic foresight ability. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 9 (Study 3), 
cannabis continues to be the world’s most used illicit drug and despite the general perception 
that it is a benign substance (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014) early 
introduction to the drug can significantly alter neuronal development and increase the 
likelihood of developing future addiction by six fold. Furthermore, regular cannabis use is 
associated with a number of deleterious psychosocial consequences (Hall, 2014; Parker et al., 
2002; Wagner & Anthony, 2002). Therefore it is particularly important to investigate drug 
specific cognitive declines across all stages of consumption, even at the very early stages as 
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greater knowledge could assist in the development of more tailored support and harm-
minimization strategies that could prevent evolution into addictive behaviours.  
10.7 Limitations of the overall research project 
One limitation of this research project relates to the heterogeneity of substance use 
history among participants, particularly in the first two investigations. As mentioned 
throughout this project, it is unlikely that opiates are the drug of preference for novice users, 
therefore it is almost inevitable that opiate-dependent individuals have an extensive history of 
poly drug abuse and/or dependence. In addition, poly drug use was also reported in some of 
the cannabis-using participants recruited in Study 3. Furthermore the opiate sample recruited 
for Study 1 was participating in opiate substitution treatment which is the first line treatment 
option for opiate dependence (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). The most 
common type is Methadone, but other substitutes include Bupenephorine, Naloxone, and 
Suboxone (which is a combination of the latter two). These substitutes induce less euphoria 
and are longer acting substances than opiates which aim to relieve physiological cravings for 
opiates (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2014). However some studies have 
identified cognitive declines associated with these substitutes (Curran et al., 2001; Darke et 
al., 2000) and thus it is difficult to delineate the effects of opiates from other substances, 
including the effects of pharmacotherapies.  
Second, a larger battery of neuropsychological measures could have been 
administered to assess a wider range of cognitive and executive functions. For example, 
including an additional measure of episodic memory would have allowed for more thorough 
assessment of this ability. However in saying that, the length of time required to administer 
the chosen battery was already substantial and increasing this could have been at a cost to the 
reliability of interpretation and participant engagement. This is because participants in the 
opiate group were already required to have refrained from consuming methadone for slightly 
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a longer period than they normally would have, and to have increased the testing time further 
would have increased the risk of withdrawal and cravings, potentially impacting engagement 
and performance on tasks.  
Third, information relating to psychiatric comorbidities, and confirmation of 
abstinence from any psychoactive substances (including alcohol) 24 hours prior to testing 
were obtained via self-report. It would have been preferable to have drug screening analysis 
and access to psychiatric diagnosis details from independent sources, but the sample was 
recruited from the general public and therefore these details were not available.  
Finally, conclusions relating to the involvement and overlap of neural substrates 
across all three studies are speculative at best given the lack of neuroimaging evidence. 
However, these suggestions are based on pre-existing neuroimaging studies that have 
implicated the involvement of similar neural mechanisms in the execution of episodic 
foresight, as well as areas which have been shown to attract structural and functional atrophy 
within the context of substance use.  
10.8 Strengths of the overall research project  
Despite some limitations, this research project had a number of strengths. For 
instance, although there was reliance on self-report, all individuals underwent a number of 
intake interviews prior to their testing sessions and individuals who reported inconsistencies 
on responses relating to drug use history, mental health diagnosis, and history of brain injury 
between interviews (as well as those who disclosed ineligibility during testing) were not 
included in the project.   
A second strength relates to the representativeness of the opiate samples. Instead of 
recruiting individuals from residential treatment facilities, the opiate users who were involved 
in Studies 1 and 2 were recruited from the general public through services that dispensed their 
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pharmacotherapy as well as organisations that provided support specifically for injecting drug 
users. Despite the well-known physical, psychological, social, and functional difficulties 
associated with opiate use, the samples recruited for studies 1 and 2 are representative of a 
hig-functioning subset of a clinical group as their participation in this research project was 
reliant on their personal motivation to attend as well as their capacity to do so. Therefore, the 
findings of Studies 1 and 2 could certainly translate to real life application as the opiate users 
recruited for this project represent individuals who would most likely present to community 
provided treatment services. 
Lastly, the sample sizes of the three investigations were large compared to clinical 
samples recruited for previous studies investigating episodic foresight, as well as those 
assessing the cognitive impact of opiate and cannabis use (see Table 2 below). Furthermore it 
should be noted that despite the challenges associated with recruiting from the community all 
three studies conducted for this research project are comparable to, and indeed exceed most 
of the sample sizes those of substance-related investigations which predominately recruit 
through treatment facilities.  
10.9 Conclusion 
This research project is the first to directly examine the capacity for episodic foresight 
in the context of psychoactive substance use. Prior to this research project, the capacity for 
episodic foresight within substance-using groups could only be inferred from investigations 
of cognitive abilities that incorporated an element of future-oriented thought. The findings of 
the three studies make a significant contribution to the literature relating to the cognitive 
functioning of substances users, and are an addition to the evolving literature relating to 
episodic foresight ability. The unique findings of these three studies provide a platform for 
future investigations into the cognitive capacities of substance users which may have 
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profound implications for the way services approach the treatment of problematic substance 
use.  
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Table 2. 
Sample sizes of previous studies investigating episodic foresight, opiate use, and cannabis use  
Episodic foresight studies  Opiate studies  Cannabis studies 
Authors Groups n  Authors Groups n  Authors Groups n 
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Note: ASD = Austism Spectrum Disorder, PD = Parkinson’s Disease
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Appendix B – 2 Information Letter 
INFORMATION LETTER 
Copy for Participant to Keep 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Future thinking and drug use 
PRIMARY STAFF SUPERVISOR: Dr. Gill Terrett 
CO - STAFF SUPERVISOR: Prof Peter Rendell 
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ms. Kimberly Mercuri 






Australian Catholic University Limited 
ABN 15 050 192 660 
Melbourne Campus (St Patrick’s) 
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy, Vic. 3065 
Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy MCD VIC 3065 






You are invited to take part in a research project on illicit drug use and the ability to mentally 
time travel into the future and pre-experience an event. This type of thinking has been linked 
to other important functions such as memory, which are needed for successful completion of 
basic everyday tasks. This project involves one group of participants who currently engage in 
an opiate substitution program, and a comparison group of participants who do not have a 
history of substance abuse or dependence.  Participants will be asked to complete an 
individual testing session of up to three hours at a mutually convenient time. Testing will take 
place at the Australian Catholic University, Melbourne Campus or at a mutually convenient 
location. During this time participants will complete a background questionnaire, question 
and answer tasks, as well as a brief interview. In appreciation for your participation, you will 
be financially reimbursed for your time at a rate of $10 per hour. Qualifying undergraduate 
psychology students will also receive course credit. 
 
Participants will not be asked to take any illicit substances.  Indeed, consent cannot be given 
or activities completed if the participant arrives at the testing situation under the influence of 
any substance or has consumed any drugs in the past 24 hours.  This study will not involve 
any diagnosis or treatment of drug use problems.  Participants with concerns about their 
health and/or regarding drug use should contact their general practitioner or drug use hot line 
such as Turning Point: alcohol and drug centre direct line – 1800 888 236. ACU students can 
contact the university’s counselling services; and for those who require a psychological 
referral, Dr. Barbara Jones of ACU Melbourne can also be contacted.  
 
The primary investigator of this study is Miss Kimberly Mercuri who is currently completing 
her Masters of Psychology/Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University, 
Melbourne campus. The testing session will involve the following. 
• Background Questionnaire: This questionnaire asks you to indicate your age, gender, level of 
education, level of English and a general rating of your health. If you are a regular user of 
recreation drugs you will also be asked to indicate the type/s of drugs regularly consumed, 
quantity, frequency and duration of drug use. If you have never used illicit drugs, you will be 
asked to confirm that you have no significant history of any other substance use, or previous 
psychiatric or brain injury diagnoses. If you are unable to confirm this, unfortunately you do not 
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meet the criteria for being included in this study. You will not be asked to answer any other 
questions related to drug use.  
 
• Background Tests: There are several background tests. They will require you to pronounce 
words, complete sentences, complete a puzzle, and verbally describe pictures. Any verbal 
responses will be transcribed by the student researcher, and one task will require audio recording 
of answers. 
 
• Interview: Participants will be provided with various cue words and asked to remember or 
imagine personally relevant experiences related to the cues provided. The interview will be audio 
taped and later independently transcribed in order to analyse and score the verbal responses 
provided by participants. Identifying information will not be requested during the interview.  
 
 
Participation in this research project is voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the study at 
any stage without giving reason. As identifying information will be not kept with the data at 
any stage, it will not be possible to withdraw your data once you have completed the testing 
session and submitted the data. 
 
The researchers will take every reasonable precaution to maintain your confidentiality.  
Names or any identifying information will not be recorded on any of the raw data or kept 
with any of the processed data; and consent forms will be submitted separately and kept 
separate to raw data.  The only information kept with the data will be the information outlined 
in the description of the biographical questionnaire (sex, age in years, and years of education, 
general health rating, drug use rating).  Hand written responses are minimise with an 
electronic version of the background questionnaire which requires participants to check the 
relevant boxes. Individual participants or their results will not be identified in any future 
presentation of the results; only group results will be presented in any report.  Also, given that 
illicit substance use is unlawful, the researchers cannot guarantee that a third party could not 
use some legal process to gain access to the data.  It is stressed that identifying information 
will not be kept with the data in order to make re-identifying data difficult.  
 
Any questions regarding this project can be directed to the staff supervisors: Dr. Gill Terrett 
and Assoc. Prof Peter Rendell in the School of Psychology, St. Patrick’s Campus (Australian 
Catholic University, 115 Victoria parade, Fitzroy 3065). 
 
Dr. Gill Terrett    Professor Peter Rendell 
Phone: 03 9953 3121    Phone: 03 9953 3126 
Fax: 03 9953 3205    Fax: 03 9953 3195 
Email: Gill.Terrett@acu.edu.au   Email: Peter.Rendell@acu.edu.au 
 
The Human Research Ethics Committee at Australian Catholic University has approved this 
study.  In the event that you have any complaint or concern about the way you have been 
treated during the study, or if you have any query that the Student Researcher and Staff 
Supervisor have not been able to satisfy, you may write to:  
Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee 
C/o Research Services 
Australian Catholic University 
Locked Bag 4115 
FITZROY, VIC.  3065  Ph: 03 9953 3157 Fax: 03 9953 3315  
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Any complaint will be treated in confidence and investigated fully.  The participant will be 
informed of the outcome.  
 
If you are willing to participate please sign the attached informed consent forms.  You should 
sign both copies of the consent form and keep one copy for your records and return the other 
copy to the staff supervisor.   
 












































Dr. Gill Terrett  





Professor Peter Rendell  
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Appendix B – 3 Consent Forms 
 Appendix B – 3.1 Copy for Participants 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Copy for Participants to Keep 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Future thinking and drug use 
PRIMARY STAFF SUPERVISOR: Dr. Gill Terrett 
CO - STAFF SUPERVISOR: Professor Peter Rendell 
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ms. Kimberly Mercuri 
COURSE: Masters of Psychology (Clinical)/PhD 
 
 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Australian Catholic University Limited 
ABN 15 050 192 660 
Melbourne Campus (St Patrick’s) 
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy, Vic. 3065 
Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy MCD VIC 3065 





I   (the participant) have read and understood the 
information in the letter inviting participation in this research project, and any questions I 
have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study realising 
that I can withdraw at any time.   
Please Tick: 
  I agree to participate in the activities as outlined in the Information Letter. This 
involves completing a testing session taking up to three hours comprising of 
answering a background questionnaire, several background tests, computerized tests, 
and a brief interview.  
  I agree to the audio taping of my responses to the sentence completion task and the 
one-on-one interview as outlined in the Information Letter.  
    I agree to participate in this activity realising that information gathered will remain 
confidential and secure except when: 
 It is required by Law 
 Failure to disclose the information would place you or another person at risk, 
OR 
 Researchers have obtained your prior approval to share your information with                
                     a third party  
   I agree that research data collected for the study may be published or provided to  
            other researchers  
  in a form that does not identify me in any way.  
  I am over 18 years of age.  
 
Name: ............................... Signature: ..................................   Date: ........................... 
 
Miss. Kimberly Mercuri  
Research Student 
Date: ....................................... 
Dr. Gill Terrett  
Primary Staff Supervisor 
Date: ................................. 
Professor Peter Rendell  
Co - Staff Supervisor 
Date: .................................... 
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Appendix B – 3.2 Copy for Researcher 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Copy for Researcher 
TITLE OF PROJECT: Future thinking and drug use 
PRIMARY STAFF SUPERVISOR: Dr. Gill Terrett 
CO - STAFF SUPERVISOR: Professor Peter Rendell 
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Ms. Kimberly Mercuri 
COURSE: Masters of Psychology (Clinical)/PhD 
 
 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Australian Catholic University Limited 
ABN 15 050 192 660 
Melbourne Campus (St Patrick’s) 
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy, Vic. 3065 
Locked Bag 4115 Fitzroy MCD VIC 3065 





I   (the participant) have read and understood the 
information in the letter inviting participation in this research project, and any questions I 
have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study realising 
that I can withdraw at any time.   
Please Tick: 
  I agree to participate in the activities as outlined in the Information Letter. This 
involves completing a testing session taking up to three hours comprising of 
answering a background questionnaire, several background tests, computerized tests, 
and a brief interview.  
  I agree to the audio taping of my responses to the sentence completion task and the 
one-on-one interview as outlined in the Information Letter.  
    I agree to participate in this activity realising that information gathered will remain 
confidential and secure except when: 
 It is required by Law 
 Failure to disclose the information would place you or another person at risk, 
OR 
 Researchers have obtained your prior approval to share your information with  
                       a third party  
   I agree that research data collected for the study may be published or provided to  
            other researchers  
  in a form that does not identify me in any way.  
  I am over 18 years of age.  
 




Miss. Kimberly Mercuri  
Research Student 
Date: ....................................... 
Dr. Gill Terrett  
Primary Staff Supervisor 
Date: ................................. 
Professor Peter Rendell  
Co - Staff Supervisor 
Date: .................................... 
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Appendix C Background Measures 
Appendix C – 1 Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Background Questionnaire (methadone sample cover) 
 
 
To participate in this study you need to confirm all of the following statements. If you are 
unable to confirm ALL of the statements, unfortunately you are not eligible to participate 
in this study. 
 
 
1.   I am over 18 years old 
 
2.   I have a history of heroin dependence 
 
3.   I am currently participating in a methadone maintenance program for my 
heroin dependence 
4.   I do not have a history of head injury that led to hospitalization 
 
5.   I do not have any formal diagnosis of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) or Acquired 
Brain injury (ABI) 
6.   I have been stable on my methadone for at least 2 weeks 
 
7.   I have not consumed my methadone in the last 5 hours 
 
8.   I have not used heroin or other illicit drugs within the last 24 hours 
 
9.   I have never been a heavy drinker of alcohol. This is regularly drinking to 
intoxication or having more than 28 standard drinks per week if you are male, or 
more than 14 standard drinks per week if you are female. 
10. English is my first language 
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Background Questionnaire (control sample cover) 
 
 
To participate in this study you need to confirm all of the following statements. If you are 




1.   I am over 18 years old 
 
2.   I do not have a history of alcohol or drug dependence 
 
3.   I do not have a history of head injury that led to hospitalization 
 
4.   I do not have any formal diagnosis of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) or Acquired Brain 
injury (ABI) 
5.   I have not used alcohol or any other illicit drug within the last 24 hours 
 
6.   I have never been a heavy drinker of alcohol. This is regularly drinking to intoxication 
or having more than 28 standard drinks per week if you are male, or more than 14 
standard drinks per week if you are female. 
7.   English is my first language 
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Section 1: Demographics 
 






 Living together/defacto 
 




























Highest level of education completed: 
 
 Up to Year 10 
 




 Undergraduate degree 
 
 Postgraduate degree 
 
 Other, please specify    
 
Section 2: English Language Skills 
 
Is English your first language: Yes    
 
No    
 
If NO, how many years have you spoken English?   years 
 
How do you rate your level of English? 
 
Excellent  Very good  Not very good  Poor  
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Section 3: Health 
 
Using the following as a guide please answer the questions below. Please tick the box that 
best describes you. 
Excellent: No problems 
Very good: no major problems 
Good: occasional bad days 
Not very good: a number of problems 
Poor: Persistent serious problems 
How would you describe your state of health over the last month or so? 
 
Excellent  Very good  Good Not very good  Poor  
 
How would you describe your state of health today? 
 
Excellent  Very good  Good Not very good  Poor  
 
How would you describe how you have been sleeping over the last few weeks? 
 




Section 4: Psychiatric History 
 
Are you aware of any formal psychiatric diagnoses? Yes  No  
If YES, please specify: 
 






Section 5a: Substance use 
 
The following section asks about current and past use of alcohol and drugs. For each drug 
please indicate whether you are a current user, have used in the past, or have never used 
the substance. 
 
If you are a  current user or  have used this substance in the past  please indicate: 
• The age of first use 
• The age of regular use (if applicable) 
• How often you use 
• How much of the drug you would use 
• How long you used the drug 
 
For any substance you have used please tick NEVER, and continue to the next drug. 
 
If you have never used any type of drugs you do not have to complete this section. 
 






Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1-6 standard drinks each week  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  7-14 standard drinks each week  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  15-21 standard drinks each week  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  22-27 standard drinks each week  3-5 years 
 Never/once or twice  28 or more standard drinks each 
week 
 More than 5 years 
 
Cigarettes 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  few cigarettes a day  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  less than a packet a day  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  a packet a day  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  more than a packet a day  3-5 years 
 Never/once or twice  Other  More than 5 years 
 
Cannabis 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1-3 joints at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  4-6 joints at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  7 or more joints at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
Amphetamines (e.g speed, ecstasy, ice, MDMA) Please specify 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1 pill at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  2-3 pills at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  more than 3 pills at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 






Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1 hit at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  2-3 hits at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  more than 4 hits at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 
1 hit = 0.3g heroin  More than 5 years 
 
Cocaine 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of first use:   years Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1 line at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  2-3 lines at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  more than 4 lines at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
LSD/Acid 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1-3 tabs at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  3-5 tabs at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  5 or more tabs at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
Prescription medications (e.g. Vallium, Xanax, Seroquel) 
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week  1 pill at a time  less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  2-3 pills at a time  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  more than 3 pills at a time  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  Other:  3-5 years 














Section 5b: Substance use 
If there drug/s you have used have not already been specified, please provide details in the 
space provided below. 
 
Other    
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week   less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  3-5 years 
 More than 5 years 
 
Other    
Current use  Past use  Never  
Age of regular use:   years 
Frequency Dosage Duration 
 At least once a week   less than 6 months 
 At least once a fortnight  6 months – 1year 
 At least once a month  1-3 years 
 Less than once a month  3-5 years 




Section 6: Methadone 
 
What is your current methadone dose:    
 
How long have you been on this dose:    
 
How long have you been stable on this dose:    
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Appendix D Measures of Executive Functioning 



































































You will be told a letter or category and you must tell me as many words as you can that 
begin with that letter, excluding proper nouns (e.g., peoples’ names, countries, towns 
etc.), numbers, and the same word with a different suffix (e.g. big, bigger, biggest). You 
have one minute for each letter.  You should not repeat words. For example, if the letter 
is ‘N’, you could say ‘Nasty’, Natural’ and ‘Night’. 
 
Practice Trial: 






Tell me as many words as you can that begin with the letter: 
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Appendix E  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
Please read each item below and tick next to the reply which comes closest to how you have 
been feeling in the past week. Don’t take too long over your replies, your immediate reaction 
will probably be more accurate than a long thought-out response. 
I feel tense or ‘wound up’ 
Most of the time 
A lot of the time 
From time to time, occasionally 
Not at all 
 
 
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy 
Definitely as much 
Not quite so much 
Only a little 
Hardly at all 
 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something 
awful is about to happen 
Very definitely and quite badly 
Yes, but not too badly 
A little, but it doesn’t worry me 
Not at all 
 
 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things 
As much as I always could 
Not quite so much now 
Definitely not so much now 
Not at all 
 
 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind 
A great deal of the time 
A lot of the time 








Most of the time 
 
 




Not at all 
 
I feel as if I am slowed down 
Nearly all the time 
Very often 
Sometimes 
Not at all 
 
 
I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
‘butterflies’ in the stomach  
Not at all  
Occasionally  
Quite often  
Very often 
 
I have lost interest in my appearance 
Definitely 
I don’t take as much care as I should 
I may not take quite as much care 
I take just as much care as ever 
 
 
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move 
Very much indeed 
Quite a lot 
Not very much 
Not at all 
 
 
I look forward with enjoyment to things 
As much as I ever did 
Rather less than I used to 
Definitely less than I used to 
Hardly at all 
 
 
I get sudden feelings of panic 
Very often indeed 
Quite often 
Not very often 
Not at all 
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Appendix F  Adapted Autobiographical Interview Script (Studies 1 and 3) 
 
First I want to tell you now a bit about the next task. We want to know how people 
remember events and experiences from their past, and how they imagine events which 
might happen in the future. To help with scoring, we will audiotape your responses.  
Over the course of the experiment you will be given 6 words, one at a time.  
There will be 2 conditions: a past and a future condition. We’ll start with past/future 
condition.  
 
Counterbalance which condition you will present first.  
Pick which condition you will start with and the words you will use BEFORE the session. 
 
a) Past Condition  
So for the next 3 words you will need to remember a specific memory of a past event. It needs to 
have occurred within the last 3 years.  
A few things to know about the memory you recall are:  
• It must be an event you actually experienced.  
• The event you describe must take place over the course of less than one day (e.g. 
describing a 3 week vacation would be wrong, but describing what happened on one 
specific day of that vacation would be correct).  
• You have up to three minutes to explore this memory. However, you may not need the 
full three minutes but it is important that you recall as much detail about the event as you 
possibly can.  
• We want you to try and recall how you were thinking and feeling at the specific time 
the event took place. Recall as many smells, sights and sounds that you remember.  
• After recalling the memory after each word you will be asked a few simple questions 
before moving onto the next word.  
• You will be given a positive, a negative and neutral cue word. If there is any word that 
makes you recalling a past memory, please let me know and we can move onto the next 
word. 
Do you have any questions? Would you like an example of a response? 
Provide one example if they need it. Offer a second if they want another one. Examples you can 
provide are as follows: 
If you receive the word “BBQ” 
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“Last summer, I went to a BBQ at Gary’s place by the lake. It was a lovely sunny 
day and the lake looked beautiful. Before dinner we went out in the boat. Some 
of us also went swimming. We had a lovely dinner with steak and vegetable 
kebabs, and cake for dessert. I helped Gary clean up after dinner, while some 
other friends made a campfire. We roasted marshmallows on whatever twigs we 
could find in the yard, and sang songs while Gary played guitar.”  
 
If you receive the word “Fur”, this may remind you of a specific memory of your 
cat. You could say:  
 
“This word reminds me of my cat Tiger. I remember when I chose Tiger at the 
RSPCA. It was a cold overcast day and I remember the cages looking at all of the 
various cats. I remember this one grey cat curled up sleeping in the corner. It 
made me feel instantly protective towards this cat. I felt emotional because he 
reminded me of my childhood cat. I remember adopting Tiger and bringing him 
home with me. I bought him home in a box and he sat next to me in the 
passenger seat.” 
 
Do you have any questions before we begin?  
 
Introducing cue words Please tell me as much and detailed as possible about a specific 
(positive/negative/neutral) event, happening in the last three years that involves the word Xxx. 
 
After each word have the participant complete the post interview questionnaire.  
 
b) Future Condition  
So for the next 3 words I want you to think about a single event that might happen on a 
particular day in the future. I want you to create or imagine or invent a scenario that hasn’t 
happened to you before. We are interested in how people imagine events which might 
happen in the future, so it needs to be something new to you, something that you have not 
previously-experienced. For the next 3 words you will be required to imagine an event which 
may occur in the future.  
• It must be no more than three years into the future.  
• This event must be one that you may personally experience.  
• You can be creative, but you cannot be totally unrealistic, e.g. you can’t tell me 
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about going to the moon tomorrow 
• The event you describe must take place over the course of less than one day (e.g. 
describing a 3 music festival would be wrong, but describing what will happen on one 
specific day of that festival would be correct).  
• You have up to 3 minutes to explore this memory. However, you may not need the 
full three minutes but it is important that you recall as much detail about the event as 
you possibly can.  
• We want you to try and imagine how you would be thinking and feeling at the 
specific time the event takes place. For example, smells, sights and sounds that you 
can imagine.  
• You will be given a positive, a negative and neutral cue word. If there is any word 
that makes you uncomfortable imagining a future scenario, please let me know and 
we can move onto the next word. 
 
Do you have any questions? Would you like an example of a response? 
Provide one example if they need it. Offer a second if they want another one.  
 
You may receive the word “Peach”.  
“I imagine a hot summary day. I am with my two friends Sophie and Tess. We 
are sitting under a peach tree and we have set up a picnic, we have laid out a 
tartan rug and have opened a bottle of wine. Sophie has made a cheese and fruit 
platter. I feel very relaxed and happy because I have just finished my exams. The 
sun is on my back and it is making me very relaxed.”  
 
If you receive the word “Vacation‟ (only use this one if Vacation is not a cue word in the future 
condition) 
“Next week, I will be visiting Toronto, and I see myself doing some sightseeing 
around the city with my friend from Toronto, Sarah. At the end of the day, we 
decided to go to the CN Tower. I have seen the tower in the city before but I 
have never been up in the tower to see the view. We go up to the observatory 
deck to look at the view which is amazing, especially as the sun is setting. I take 
a photo of the view from different windows and we stand on a glass floor looking 
down at the ground.”  
Do you have any questions before we begin?  
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Introducing cue words: Please tell me as much and detailed as possible about a specific 
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Appendix G Modified Interview Script (Study 2) 
Introduction of task 
I’m going to ask you to imagine three vivid scenes in you mind’s eye. So I’ll give you a short 
description to set the scene and then I want you to take over and create as detailed a scene as 
you possibly can in your mind’s eye, and describe it out loud to me.  
 
I want to you to give free reign to your imagination and to really try hard to picture the whole 
scene in your mind’s eye as you’re describing it. Give as much detail as you possibly can, not 
forgetting to use all your available senses including sigh, sound, smell, everything. Be as 
vivid as possible; don’t hold back! Remember, this is not about memory so don’t just 




Let me give you an example to make sure you understand exactly what I want you to do. For 
instance, an example description might be: “Imagine you’re sitting on a bench in a park. 
Describe the scene in as much detail as possible”  
 
A response could be “The bench I‘m sitting on is by a path on the grassy slope of a hill. It’s a 
really sunny day on the warm summer’s afternoon. There is not cloud and the sky is clear 
blue. Lying on the grass, a young good-looking couple are kissing. Further up the hill a boy is 
trying to fly a kite. There is a strong breeze and the colourful kite which is shaped as a dragon 
is soaring in the air. The boy is running and laughing happily. At the bottom of the hills is a 
large lake with trees liming it. I can see some people swimming in it and a barking black 
Labrador runs in after a stick making a splash. There are bees buzzing around and landing on 
flowers near my bench and there is sweet smell of grass and flowers. A jogger runs past 
smelling faintly of sweat, wearing a Walkman playing some loud rap music.”  
 
So do you see what I tried to do there? I included smells and sounds as well as lots of visual 
details. I was concentrating on imagining the whole scene in my mind almost as if I was 
really there. Don’t worry if you find it difficult to begin with, or if your answer is not as 
detailed as mine; I’ve had a bit of practice! Do you have any questions? 
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Atemporal (Scene Construction) 
 
Imagine you are sitting having a drink in a café. I want you to describe the experience and the 
surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses including what you can see, 




I want you to listen and then I want you to take over and create a detailed short story as you 
possibly can in your mind’s eyes, and describe it to me out loud to me. Give free reign you 
your imagination and really try hard to picture everything in your mind’s eye as you’re 
describing it.  
 
Imagine you are standing in the middle of the impressive high vaulted entrance hall of an old 
castle. There is a tower somewhere in the castle, the top of which is accessed via a circular 
winding staircase. I want you to describe to me in as much detail as possible your route 
through the castle’s many rooms and floors until you reach the top of the tower. Use all your 
senses including what you see, feel, and do on the way to the tower.  
 
 
Self-Projection (Future Thinking) 
 
I want you to imagine and describe something realistic that might actually happen to you. 
Imagine something you could be doing next summer, but just give me one event. I want you 
to describe that event and the surroundings in as much detail as possible using all your senses 
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Appendix H Research Portfolio 
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Appendix H – 3 Statement of Contribution for Study 1 
Title: Episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users 
Status: Accepted for publication in Psychopharmacology. 
 




I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 20%. 
 
Associate Professor Gill Terrett 
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
 
Associate Professor Julie Henry 
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 5%. 
 
Dr Phoebe Bailey  
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I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
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Appendix H – 4 Statement of Contribution for Study 2 
Title: Deconstructing episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users 
Status: Under review by Drug and Alcohol Dependence  
 




I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 20%. 
 
Associate Professor Gill Terrett 
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
 
Dr Phoebe Bailey  
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 5%. 
 
Associate Professor Julie Henry 
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I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
 




















EPISODIC FORESIGHT AND DRUG USE                                                                  208 
 
Appendix H – 5 Statement of Contribution for Study 3 
Title: Episodic foresight deficits in regular cannabis users 
Status: Submitted for publication in Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology  
 




I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 20%. 
 
Associate Professor Gill Terrett 
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
 
Associate Professor Julie Henry 
 
I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 5%. 
 
Dr Phoebe Bailey  
 
 




I acknowledge that my contribution to the above paper is 10%. 
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Appendix H – 6 Conferences and Other Presentations 
Mercuri, K., Terrett, G., Henry, J., Bailey, P. E., Curran, H. V., & Rendell, G. P. (2012). 
Episodic future thinking deficits in illicit substance users. Poster presentation at the British 
Association of Psychopharmacology Summer Meeting Harrogate, United Kingdom 
 
Mercuri, K., Terrett, G., Henry, J., Bailey, P. E., Curran, H. V., & Rendell, G. P. (2012). 
Episodic foresight deficits in illicit substance users. Oral presentation at the Australian 
Catholic University Psychology Conference, Melbourne, Australia [Winner of Most 
Outstanding Oral Presentation] 
 
Finalist – oral presentation ACU Three Minute Thesis Competition (2012) for presentation of 
Episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users 
 
Winner – oral presentation ACU Three Minute Thesis Competition (2013) for presentation of 
Episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users 
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